The Bitter Irony
The squabbling in Ukraine appears interesting to the participants proper, whereas analysts only wonder whether the orange project has finally failed. If yes, what’ll substitute it? If no, and it’s only several politicians that failed, how will the need for reforms be addressed?
The orange revolution boiled down to three goals: Creating an effective and transparent system of government, allowing Ukraine to opt for a European future, and turning free and fair elections into an instrument of transmitting power.
As to the first goal, no one would say that it has been success. Those who were called criminals by the orange haven’t been sent to prison. Oligarchs have retained the property they got as present or stole in the Kuchma times, and they feel no discomfort now. But the grass roots, which have faced the inflation level a record for the post-Soviet space, can’t help feeling it. In terms of corruption, Ukraine is at the beginning of the second hundred on the international list.
The European choice is a dream hardly able to be fulfilled, though it’s welcomed by the majority of the population. So far the government has only managed to get the WTO admission, which can be regarded quite an achievement, but it doesn’t offer any guarantees for the future.
It’s the electoral democracy that succeeded and became the rule of the game everyone accepts. It’s the only thing that leaves a chance for losers to come to power next time. Nevertheless, when this opportunity is used too often, the system deteriorates.
At the same time there is no white and blue alternative as it was in 2004. The special relations with Russia, which Victor Yanukovich’s camp offered then, were relevant till Ukraine’s metallurgical tycoons reckoned with cheap energy carriers, and those who devised the “Successor” plan in Russia needed electoral support and external legitimation of the victory of the candidate.
But Ukraine will get no cheap gas any longer, and it’s easier for Yanukovich to come to power either by means of lobbying, as was of case in 2006, or mobilizing protest electorate during elections. The country’s sovereignty and the succession of the political line are the common ground in this matter. That’s why Konstantin Grishchenko, Foreign Office Chief with the first Cabinet of Mr Yanukovich and member of his current team, has become Victor Yushchenko’s ambassador to Moscow.
Perhaps, this is the bitter irony of the moment. If the country could choose between two really diverse projects, it could mobilize the nation and its political class to make a breakthrough. But the mutual diffusion of the projects and the blurring of clear-cut outlines can barely offer anything impressive.
Arkady Moshes, Russian Programme Director with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs
All the Article in Russian as of June 10, 2008
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