The Soldier: A Legend in Whose Mind?
// The price of the question
The media attention in Russia to the moving of the Soviet monument in Tallinn gave Moscow the impression that its conflict with Tallinn has become a problem on the pan-European level that troubles Brussels and unceasingly churns up public opinion throughout Western Europe. That impression is erroneous, to put it mildly. In the political centers of the European Union, not every politician, never mind members of the public, will understand what just what bronze soldier is being talked about. And when he remembers it, the issue will seem immeasurably less important to him than it does in Moscow.
In Berlin, for example, members of the Bundestag were busy this week with the ratification of the new basic agreement on the European Union signed at the end of last year in Lisbon. That document, which will replace the constitution that was rejected by referendum, is to return the EU to full capacity. In comparison with that, the conflict with Tallinn, which is practically incomprehensible to Westerners, and Russian-Estonian relations in general, simply pale, and all the more so since an obvious propagandistic element is felt in the conflict in the EU. Official Moscow has overreacted to the issue of moving the Bronze Soldier, as it does in general to question of Russian-speakers' rights in the Baltic countries. At the same time, it severely limits maneuvering space for the EU.
Germany, which has been an example of a careful and respectful attitude toward Soviet war memorials, could most likely have played a more active role in the search for a compromise. But the Kremlin's foreign policy, aggressively and demonstratively supporting a force that is painfully reminiscent of a fifth column, only strengthened solidarity within the EU. The clamor in the Russian press prevented it from making any criticism of Tallinn.
Thus, Russia's use of the Bronze Soldier for propagandistic and domestic political purposes significantly reduced the meaning of the story for relations between the EU and Russia, where serious tasks remain to be completed in a very short time, especially the development of a new basic agreement between the EU and Russia. A slew of principle problems in the field of energy remain to be settled. And then there is the American missile defense system, Ukraine and Georgia's aspirations to NATO membership, the recognition of Kosovo and Russia's retaliatory relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Formally, of course, those are not the EU's problems, but their solution involves a number of member states. Do they want to be distracted by passions over a statue?
As for the economic consequences of the conflict between Russia for Estonia and the EU as a whole, they wither against the background of the global financial crisis that has caused losses of hundreds of billions of dollars. Estonia will be accepted into the euro zone on the basis of a number of macroeconomic factors, with inflation and the budget deficit being the most important. Data on Russian transshipping through Tallinn will not be decisive.
Andrey Gurkov, Deutsche Welle, Bonn
All the Article in Russian as of Apr. 25, 2008
|
