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Georgia and Russia: A Return to Normal?
// The price of the question
Tbilisi's refusal to work as a member of the Mixed Control Commission put an end to the short idyll in its relations with Moscow. It has become a new Russian-Georgian tradition to open a new page in relations. Desires are voiced periodically to improve bilateral relations, sometimes the old ties between the two peoples are mentioned (that's becoming rarer). Is it even possible to improve relations between Russia and Georgia? On the level of practical cooperation, it definitely is. Lifting the travel blockade and consumer embargo, reaching an agreement on WTO membership, easing visa procedures are all possible. But with that, the possibilities are finished, because any activity quickly touches on the territorial integrity of Georgia and there is little room for maneuvering around it.
Kosovo's declaration of independence has made matters worse for Tbilisi. Moscow clearly does not intend to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but its indecisiveness (which is really its calculation of the consequences of such a step) will be compensated for by closer ties with the unrecognized states. An “everything except recognition” model of relations is likely.
Georgia cannot make peace with the separatists and the restoration of unity will be the first priority of any leader there. Time is against Tbilisi – the longer the former autonomy has de facto independence, the less chances of a settlement are.
And NATO can be added to the already glum picture. There is a pro-NATO consensus in NATO. Tbilisi sees membership in it as the only possible guarantee of security. But it would rule out territorial integrity. NATO officials give indistinct answers when asked whether a country with unresolved territorial disputes can be admitted. In principle, they cannot. But, at the same time, Georgia should not be hostage to frozen conflicts. In other words, Russia cannot be allowed to block Georgia's with smoldering hotspots.
But if Georgia is given a chance to accede, Moscow will take it as a prelude to violence, since, with the authority of NATO behind it, Georgia may try to solve the problem of Abkhazia and South Ossetia once and for all. And then the issue of recognition as a guarantee of security would come to the fore in the Kremlin.
There is some grounds for optimism in the fact that Moscow is committal in relations with Transdniestria. But relations with Moldova never reached the critical stages as with Georgia and Chisinau is ready to agree to a lot for the sake of unity. The choice before Russia is practically whether it is more profitable for it to have a Moldovan exclave with uncertain prospects dependent on it or to have a loyal Moldova independent of any blocs. Georgia does not present that choice for Russia.
Fedor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief, Russia in Global Policy
All the Article in Russian as of Mar. 05, 2008
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