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Medvedev: The Making of a Successor
On December 10, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the name of his replacement as head of state. Finally, it is Dmitry Medvedev, who has been considered among the potential successors for more than two years. That historical moment had been preceded by so much obfuscation that the public heaved a sigh of relief when it was over. And they overlooked the fact that the process was not very smooth.
The election of Dmitry Medvedev next president of Russia practically took place last Monday in the office of his predecessor Vladimir Putin. The honor of nominating him was given to Boris Gryzlov and his electors were the heads of three parties – Sergey Mironov (Just Russia), Vladimir Plotnikov (Agrarian Party) and Mikhail Barshchevsky (Civic Force), as well as Putin himself.
In the short discussion that preceded the nomination, three points were brought out that every Russian should know. First, as Putin emphasized, the nomination was made by four parties that “have as their basis a broad platform and represent the interests of most of groups of the population.” (All told, they received over 75 percent of the vote in the recent Duma elections.) Second, Putin “worked closely and fruitfully” with Medvedev for over 17 years and “fully supports the nomination.” Third, the first deputy prime minister, Gryzlov assured us, is “the most socially oriented candidate of all possible” and is the most suitable for a steering the course of raising the quality of life that the United Russia Party has set for the next four years.
They heap new praise onto those facts as well. Social-democrat Mironov stated that it was personally for him “very important that he is Vladimir Putin's closest advisor.” Liberal Barshchevsky called Medvedev “a person of absolutely democratic views” and “the most optimal candidate for the democratic development of Russia.” Agrarian Plotnikov mentioned that the first deputy prime minister had successfully managed the agricultural national projects, thanks to which “there has been substantial progress in the last two years.”
On the same day, the new candidate was subjected to a storm of praise from Russian Political and public figures, and Western analysts, who called him the best of all possible. The next day, Medvedev appeared on television to propose to Putin that, in the interest of real succession of power, he take the post of prime minister after he leave the office of president.
The foreigners were less taken with that idea. Putin of the KGB, they said, had found a way to stay in power. But Russian politicians and analysts were ecstatic. The most advanced of them noted that Medvedev's suggestion would in practice turn Russia into a parliamentary republic, where, even without redividing the power between the president and the prime minister, the latter, as the leader of the ruling party and a political powerhouse, will become the real master of the country, like the chancellor in Putin's beloved Germany.
In any case, the idea of running the Medvedev-Putin team in the presidential elections looks like a solid political move. First of all, the post of prime minister with real authority (which could be expanded without changes to the Constitution, but with only amendments to the law “On the Government”) is obviously better for the current head of state than having the status of “national leader,” which is unknown to any laws. Furthermore, Putin will carry Medvedev forward in the elections the way he carried the United Russia Party in the Duma campaign, without even having his name on the ballot. Finally, the Kremlin does not have to impede the presidential election so that the successor receives fewer votes in March than Putin did in December. Medvedev in tandem may receive far more in the first round than the 64 percent United Russia received in December.
Medvedev's appointment as the final successor can be considered both expected and surprising. At the beginning of Putin's second term, he was the first to receive an administrative post appropriate to a successor. He was transferred in November 2005 from the presidential administrative staff, which he headed, to the post of first deputy prime minister and put in charge of the extremely important national projects. Then Sergey Ivanov, as another potential successor, was made a “plain” deputy prime minister.
Medvedev's popularity began to grow after that. In the summer of 2006, he was the clear leader in the Levada Center's electoral ratings (the only poll in the country that asked whom Russians would vote for in the absence of Putin). Medvedev's lead over Ivanov peaked at 17 percent in September and remained high through the beginning of this year in a hypothetical second round of voting. In January, he would have won against Ivanov, ho was then still defense minister, with 54 percent of the vote. In the autumn of 2006, Medvedev topped a rating of trust, outshining LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov and eternally second-rated Emergency Situations Minister Sergey Shoigu.
United Russia has given Medvedev its clear blessing. His speeches are regularly published on the party's website, although he is not a party member, and there is a quotation on the cover of the book United Russia Party Worker: “Medvedev is quite correct when he says that work on priority projects is very important.” Party members had thought that the first deputy prime minister would top the party list for the Duma elections. Ivanov was considered the leader of the party later called Just Russia, formed from the unification of the Fatherland Party, Russian Party of Life and Russian Pensioners' Party.
On the other hand, the nomination of Medvedev can be considered unexpected since Ivanov was mentioned as the more likely successor all year. That began after he and Medvedev were made equals in rank in February. Many analysts thought Ivanov should be considered the first candidate for successor. According to press accounts, he could have succeeded Mikhail Kasyanov as prime minister in the summer of 2000. In his book From the First Person, acting president of Russia Vladimir Putin called Ivanov the first among those he trusts ad with whom he shares a “common bond.” “Dima Medvedev” was mentioned third on that list, after Ivanov and FSB director Nikolay Patrushev.
Since Ivanov received equal rank with Medvedev not only in the government but on the airwaves as well, Ivanov began to catch up with Medvedev in popularity after February of this year. In April, the former defense minister Ivanov passed Medvedev in the Levada Center presidential rating for the first time, with 31 percent to Medvedev's 29 percent, and his lead has been continual since June. He also regularly beat Medvedev in the virtual second round, peaking at an 18-percent lead (59 percent to 41 percent) in September.
United Russia reacted to those developments, which began preening Ivanov in the autumn of 2007 to top the party list for the Duma elections. When Viktor Zubkov was appointed prime minister in September, many analysts thought that he should then be considered the successor, and the public seemed to agree.
Evaluations of Putin's premiership under president Medvedev are equally ambiguous.
Although the current president has not yet responded, and will not respond soon, if Ivanov is to be believed, no commentators doubt that the proposal was agreed on in advance between predecessor and successor. Putin himself did not exclude the possibility. At the United Russia Party congress on October 1, he stated that he would become prime minister under two conditions: if United Russia wins in the parliamentary elections and an “orderly, modern, competent person” is elected president. The first condition has been met officially, and the second practically so, since Medvedev's nomination practically guarantees his victory.
The nomination of the Putin-Medvedev tandem happened a bit too fast. It was a week before the end of the period for self-nomination and almost two weeks before the end of the period for party nominations. The names of the last two prime ministers were made known only a few days before they took office, and Russians found out about Putin's heading the United Russia Party list in live television, so the open manner for choosing the successor is truly unprecedented.
Assuming that there no hidden complexities in the announcing of the nomination, there can be three explanation for the Kremlin's timing.
The first explanation is that the majority of politicians thought worse about Putin that the reality is. For example, they were sure that he would not give up the presidency to anyone and would change the Constitution's prohibition on third terms. But the document remains untouched. Then observers suggested that the successor would be one of Putin's security services cronies. But instead it is Medvedev, a lawyer from St. Petersburg. Finally, they suggested that the current president could never stand to be subordinate to anyone. They were wrong about that too.
The second explanation is that Putin was forced to announce the nomination when he did. With the long-time conflict between the Kremlin enforcement sector and the liberals reaching a boil within the enforcement community, as reflected in the article by State Committee on the Control of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances chief Viktor Cherkesov in Kommersant, the president was simply unable to take more time in his selection because the indeterminacy of the issue made it more likely that one side or the other would take drastic measures (such as arrests and criminal charges) to convince the head of state of its necessity.
If that is the case, the Kremlin tried to kill two birds with one stone. Medvedev is a liberal by conviction and a statist by obligation and can united voters of varying views. But he is also considered a weak politician, so he could use Putin to back up his authority. Putin would remain the guarantor of the checks and balances of the system to prevent the disappointed enforcement representatives from undermining the president or the jubilant liberals from going after their opponents with a fury.
There is a third possibility. Maybe nothing has been decided, Putin is not willing to reveal his true plans yet, and the nomination of Medvedev is just another smokescreen. If that is the case, another potential successor should show up among the presidential candidates soon, and Putin will make his final decision at the last moment, just before the vote. A group of citizens could nominate a second successor no later than December 18. That would be logical, since the first successor comes from United Russia with the support of three other parties. If another pro-Putin party does it, Sazhi Umalatova's Party of Peace and Unity or the Patriots of Russia, they would have until December 23.
Of course, informed sources say that Medvedev's advisors have no doubt that the final decision has already been made, and there will be no other successor. But we can only be completely sure after December 23. Former intelligence officer Putin has already shown more than once that he can make unpredictable decisions.
Presidential Successor Ratings*
| Dmitry Medvedev |
63 |
| Gennady Zyuganov |
15 |
| Vladimir Zhirinovsky |
14 |
| Grigory Yavlinsky |
4 |
| Mikhail Kasyanov |
2 |
| Boris Nemtsov |
1 |
*Respondents were asked “Which of these people would you be willing to vote for if the election were held next Sunday?” Answers expressed in percentages of those who intend to take part in the election and expressing a preference for one of the candidates.
Source: The Levada Center, poll of 1600 people in 46 subjects of the Russian Federation. Statistical error rate: <3 percent. |
Presidential Ratings of the Three Successors*
| |
Dmitry Medvedev |
Sergey Ivanov |
Viktor Zubkov |
| April 2006 |
18 |
17 |
- |
| May 2006 |
24 |
17 |
- |
| June 2006 |
22 |
13 |
- |
| July 2006 |
25 |
16 |
- |
| August 2006 |
22 |
16 |
- |
| September 2006 |
30 |
13 |
- |
| October 2006 |
24 |
17 |
- |
| November 2006 |
29 |
19 |
- |
| December 2006 |
38 |
23 |
- |
| January 2007 |
33 |
21 |
- |
| February 2007 |
32 |
27 |
- |
| March 2007 |
31 |
25 |
- |
| April 2007 |
29 |
31 |
- |
| May 2007 |
34 |
31 |
- |
| June 2007 |
27 |
31 |
- |
| July 2007 |
29 |
37 |
- |
| August 2007 |
34 |
36 |
- |
| September 2007 |
30 |
34 |
4 |
| October 2007 |
26 |
25 |
19 |
| November 2007 |
24 |
25 |
20 |
| December 2007 |
35 |
21 |
17 |
*Respondents were asked “Which of these people would you be willing to vote for if the election were held next Sunday?” Answers expressed in percentages of those who intend to take part in the election and expressing a preference for one of the candidates.
Source: The Levada Center, poll of 1600 people in 46 subjects of the Russian Federation. Statistical error rate: <3 percent. |
Dmitry Kamyshev
All the Article in Russian as of Dec. 17, 2007
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