Playing the Game of Ukrainian Politics
Game rules in the Ukrainian politics are completely different from those in Russia. Here, the presidential election winner’s name is known at the very beginning of the campaign. Moreover, it has been known long before the current month that the new president will be the current president’s political successor. The issue of prime minister has also become absolutely clear after Dmitry Medvedev’s statement on Tuesday. In spring, at least three out of the four parliamentary factions will vote for Vladimir Putin, which exceeds the constitutional majority by far.
In Ukraine, everything is different. There, the outcome of Supreme Rada voting can depend on just one or two deputies, while the opposition can actively obstruct appointing the prime minister, up to taking the voting card away from the speaker’s hands by force. In part, it is a feature of the Ukrainian political process’ traditional peculiarities. The process is much more pluralist and ‘uncontrollable’ than in Russia. And it is not the only difference.
The matter is, Ukraine’s political class has got used to its liberty, and does not want to surrender it. For instance, the president, when making important decisions, has to consult both the pro-authority forces and the opposition. Just in the tough political confrontation, as in spring 2007 when Viktor Yushchenko dissolved the Rada, the president can make ‘lion’ decisions, and not ‘fox’ ones, speaking in classic terms of Machiavelli, though the lion decisions encounter his opponents’ strong protest.
However, this paradigm is questioned now. If Yulia Tymoshenko became the prime minister, she would be able to initiate a step-by-step reconsideration of unwritten rules. Tymoshenko has a tough leadership style, an ambition to achieve a maximally possible result, even if at the cost of conflict with political opponents, primarily with ‘eastern’ tycoons on whose resources the Party of Regions strongly relies. Besides, these actions might become not just an exception confirming the general rule, but a new rule imposed on the political class. And then, the lion decisions would become a norm. Especially if Tymoshenko’ uses her PM position as a foothold for the next presidential election. At least, her most prominent promises – to reimburse the bankrupt Soviet deposits to Sberbank customers and to shortly create a professional army – prove it.
The fact that the presidential bloc members are to take most positions in the government does not change the situation. Tymoshenko’s political “charisma”, as well as pragmatic calculation (if her ratings run ahead of Yushchenko’s) can turn many members of the presidential team into the political allies of “the only man in Ukraine’s politics”, as Tymoshenko is sometimes called. Meanwhile, sole Yuri Ekhanurov, tipped for the defense minister, can hardly become a counterbalance to the charismatic PM and possible presidential candidate. Hence the tough struggle in the Rada, stimulated by the fears of politicians and businessmen.
Alexei Makarkin, deputy director general of the Political Technologies Center
All the Article in Russian as of Dec. 12, 2007
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