Case Study: Countries where the OSCE decided not to watch
February 1995. The OSCE did not send its mission to parliamentary election in Tajikistan, declaring the campaign non-democratic. Only pro-administration parties ran in that campaign. In 1999, the OSCE refused to watch the presidential election (Emomali Rakhmonov gathered 96.4 percent of votes), having decided they “cannot be democratic”.
December 1995. The OSCE did not send observers to Moscow-organized election of Chechen president, won by Doku Zavgaev. The OSCE called the election “early”. OSCE observers did not accept the invitations to visit presidential and parliamentary elections in the republic in 2004-2005. However, in those cases they said that elections in one of Russia’s subjects “do not present any interest for the organization”.
October 16, 1996. The OSCE decided not to send its observers to local administration elections in Albania, scheduled for October 20. The decision was made as a protest against the fact that not all observers received accreditation from the authorities.
December 5, 1999. The OSCE refused to send its mission to the presidential election of January 9, 2000, in Uzbekistan, eventually won by Islam Karimov with 92 percent of votes. OSCE members said the election would “definitely not change anything”.
October 24, 2005. The OSCE decided not to watch the parliamentary election in Transdniestria held on December 11, 2005. The watchdog had earlier offered to the authorities to put off the voting day by eight months, so as to prepare the election in accordance with democratic standards, but received a refusal.
January 31, 2007. The OSCE refused to participate in monitoring the presidential election in Turkmenistan scheduled for February 11, referring to the lack of time for preparing a completely qualified mission. Consequently, Gurbanguly Berdymuhammed won with 89 percent of votes.
Russia-OSCE Conflict’s Development
Late September 2007. It became known that the European organizations did not receive invitations to send their observers to the December election in Russia. Before, the invitations were always sent out several months ahead of an election.
October 22. The OSCE and the PACE expressed concern over the situation. Russia’s Central Election Commission (CEC) assured that the invitations would be sent right after the registration of candidates was complete. CEC head Vladimir Churov promised to the OSCE/ODIHR to submit the list of documents necessary to form the observer mission.
October 26. After the EU-Russia summit in Portugal, European politicians said they had agreed with
President Vladimir Putin on inviting the OSCE observers. Same day, Russia’s Ambassador to the OSCE Alexei Borodavkin announced there was a draft resolution under development which limited ODIHR work. He explained there are “political, organizational, and personnel claims” to the organization.
October 28-30. European organizations received invitations. Not over 70 ODIHR observers were invited, while up to 400 attended the last Duma election.
October 31. The CEC approved “Specifications of the procedure of international observers’ work at the State Duma elections”, which considerably limited their work. On November 2, the OSCE decided to send observers to Russia, expressing concern over the shortage of time needed for high-quality preparation of the mission.
November 11. The OSCE said the observers cannot receive visas in Russian embassies, and if the delay lasts for a week, they will have to give up the idea of coming.
November 13. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the OSCE members are to blame for visa difficulties, because they “made no effort” to supply their observers with information on required documents. The ministry accused the ODIHR of an attempt “to shift the responsibility for their own tardiness onto the host”.
