Russian President Vladimir Putin (right), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko (left), Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev (second left) and Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon are seen at at CIS summit in Dushanbe.
Photo: Dmitry Azarov
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Little Less Conversation, Little More Action
The Price of the Question
Results of the 3 in 1 summit of former Soviet republics’ leaders in Dushanbe were largely perceived as groundbreaking for military, political and economic integration within the CIS. Agreements which were signed should indeed give observers an impression that Moscow has made several moves forward for years to come in a growing geopolitical battle for Central Asia. “Customs union as a way to the common economic space”, “The CSTO as a Euroasian alternative for the NATO,” “Collective peacekeeping contingent as a guarantee for peace and stability in the CIS” – these slogans cannot but impress domestic and foreign audience.
But what is the real cost of these agreements? If we close eyes on their propaganda effect, the treaties are in fact worth quite a little. Let me put it in a more definite way: they are not likely to ever come true. Over the CIS’s past fifteen years, scores of similar initiatives disappeared without a trace.
It is important to understand another thing. Why did solo-performing Moscow decided to take it all over now? There are four reasons. First, Russia is anxious to prove that its post-Soviet polices in the CIS have not changed much, and it is still going to retain and increase its influence there. Second, Moscow shows to the United States and the West that it has its own clearly defined geopolitical ground in Eurasia which it will never give up. In the third reason, Russia makes a demonstration not only for the West but also for China, showing that it does not confine itself to the SCO which has Moscow and Beijing as leaders in an effort to include in its policy orbit Central Asia. The Kremlin also holds such important tool as CSTO that China doesn’t have. Finally, Russia is trying to make up for an unstoppable decline of economic influence in Central Asia, in particular in relations with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
Unfortunately, the Central Asian part of the CIS remains fragile despite the array of plans. In late 1980s perestroika, local elites were supporting the last Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev as an alternative for emerging democratic movements. It was then that the term Gorbistan was coined. However, creating Putistan in present-day Central Asia will be impossible due to several reasons. The problem is not only in the traditional low efficiency of the CIS. More importantly, the Central Asia is anticipating the change of elites. There are no guarantees that those who will take over from incumbent leaders do not decide to review recent strategic agreements.
Last but not the least, the West has grown smarter, and it is not longer trying to topple local regimes at any cost in velvet revolutions. So, the collective peacekeeping contingent, which is created to fight them, may become jobless.
Alexey Malashenko, expert at the Moscow Carnegie Center
All the Article in Russian as of Oct. 08, 2007
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