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Who Gets What
At the beginning of the year, Vlast analytical weekly tried to predict how many seats the Russian parties would receive in the next Duma and what they would do to deserve them. The division of power in Russian politics has not changed substantially since then, but the numerical indicators need certain amendments.
The rating contains the parties that, in our opinion have the greatest chance of overcoming the seven-percent barrier. Judging from recent surveys and the assessment of Vlast's experts, at the beginning of September 2007, there are still four such parties in Russia: United Russia, Just Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. United Russia's rating, according to out calculations, has risen in the last seven months from 42 percent to 49 percent, while Just Russia has lost 2 percent (from 19 percent to 17 percent). The LDPR has also slipped somewhat in popularity (from 10 percent to 9 percent), while the Communists have gained more than 5 percent (from 9.4 percent to 15 percent).
Those indicators, with the redistribution of votes cast for parties that do not receive seven percent of the total, will permit the four parties currently in the parliament to divide 450 seats among themselves in the next Duma, which, we remind the reader, will be elected exclusively from party lists. Even though emerging tendencies among the voters indicate that those voting for parties that will not be represented in the Duma may fall from 20 percent to 10 percent, that will noticeably reduce the size of the prize for the parties that succeed in entering the Duma.
The rating is calculated in eight parameters that are key to the campaigns of any self-respecting national party.
1. Stability of orientation (140 seats)
This indicator takes into consideration the presence of devoted supporters in a party who will vote for the brand name no matter what. The party in power has the most of them, of course, (those who always support the leadership), followed by the Communists (those who would return to the Soviet past). Just Russia, power party No. 2, was a disappointment in this respect, allowing many of the supporters of the three parties that merged to form it in October 2006 to disperse. There is nothing good to say about the LDPR here either. It lost more than it found.
United Russia – 80
CPRF – 28
Just Russia – 23
LDPR – 9
2. Influence (100 seats)
Parties' access to government resources will play an extremely important role in the Duma elections. United Russia, supported by the Kremlin and the majority of the governors, is untouchable in this category. Just Russia's hopes for receiving the support of regional elites has been realized only partially. Although Just Russia showed good results in a number of regions in the March regional elections, those victories gave them little real power. Some members of the elite who had gone over to Mironov have been returning to United Russia as the elections approach.
United Russia – 63
Just Russia – 22
CPRF – 8
LDPR – 7
3. The War Chest (70 seats)
The significance of this parameter, considering the sums the parties have at their disposal, has been shrinking lately, if only because purely party-based elections require many fewer expenses than the former mixed system with half the Duma coming from single-mandate districts. But, as before, it is not possible to advance new party leaders, hold memorable events and actions and work productively with the media. Not even Just Russia, which has accumulated a significant sum, can compete with United Russia here.
United Russia – 51
Just Russia – 13
LDPR – 4
CPRF – 2
4. The Lead Role (45 seats)
The role of this factor has increased recently. With practically identical programs and similar slogans, the presence of a noticeable figure among the party leaders can increase the party's popularity with the voters. Just Russia has done noticeably well here, picking up high-profile regional politicians from United Russia and the CPRF and succeeding in incorporating party members who were left on the sidelines by the merger of Rodina, the Party of Life and the Pensioners Party. LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, formerly the leader in this category, has lost ground, without any noteworthy actions in the interim.
CPRF – 16
LDPR – 14
Just Russia – 8
United Russia – 7
5. Camouflage Skills (35 seats)
This parameter takes into account parties' ability to attract attention to itself not only with boring congress and roundtable meetings, but also with more exciting actions like scandalous meetings and theatrical street actions in large cities. Zhirinovsky had a firm lead in this area until recently. In the last few months, Just Russia and the CPRF seem to have picked up the political street fighting tactics, and are giving him serious competition.
Just Russia – 10
United Russia – 9
CPRF – 8
LDPR – 8
6. Airtime (25 seats)
A party's access to the national media, especially the electronic media, can significantly influence the course of its campaign. Not even the most brilliant party member at the local cultural center or institute is likely to have as much effect as a few words on regional or national television. No major changes have taken place in this category since the beginning of the year, although Just Russia has increased its presence on the air a little thanks to its leader, and Zhirinovsky has practically disappeared.
United Russia – 15
Just Russia – 5
CPRF – 3
LDPR – 2
7. The Weight of Past Victory (20 seats)
Successful participation in previous elections may provide politicians with the support of voters who do not want to wade into the mire of the current political battle and vote for a party guaranteed to enter the Duma. From that point of view, the division of party power remains unchanged, although Just Russia and the CPRF have picked up a point each since the beginning of the year for their successes in the March regional parliamentary elections.
United Russia – 11
CPRF – 5
Just Russia – 4
LDPR – 0
8. Follow Up (15 seats)
This parameter, reflecting the fulfillment of campaign promises and party programs, has the least significance for the majority of Russians. But its influence is growing as the elections near. Therefore, voters are likely to pay attention to United Russia's plans to increase the salaries of workers paid from the federal budget and minimum pensions and to the CPRF's plan to nationalize the main branches of industry and restore savings lost after 1991. Just Russia's initiative to establish a “real socialist party” is not well understood by most Russians and its membership in the very pro-Western Socialist International is not likely to create a lot of voter enthusiasm.
United Russia – 9
CPRF – 5
LDPR – 1
Just Russia – 0
Total:
United Russia – 245
Just Russia – 85
CPRF – 75
LDPR – 45
Parties That Have the Right to Participate in the Elections*
1. United Russia (Boris Gryzlov)
2. Just Russia (Sergey Mironov)
3. CPRF (Gennady Zyuganov)
4. Agrarian Party of Russia (Vladimir Plotnikov)
5. LDPR (Vladimir Zhirinovsky)
6. Democratic Party of Russia (Andrey Bogdanov)
7. Patriots of Russia
8. Party of Peace and Unity (Sazhi Umalatova)
9. Union of Right Forces (Nikita Belykh)
10. Yabloko (Grigory Yavlinsky)
11. Civic Force (Alexander Ryavkin)
12. People's Union (Sergey Baburin)
13. Socialist United Party of Russia** (Vasily Shestakov)
14. Green Russian Ecological Party (Anatoly Panfilov)***
15. Russian Renaissance Party**** (Gennady Seleznev)
16. Social Justice Party (Alexey Podberezkin)
*Parties are listed in order of decreasing membership according to data from the Federal Registration Service. Names of the leaders of the parties are given in parentheses.
**The party is in the process of reforming as a nonprofit organization.
***On August 28, the presidium of the Green Party announced that the party would not participate independently in the Duma elections.
****On January 26, 2007, a party congress decided to rename the party Patriotic Forces. For the Homeland!, but the change has not yet been approved by the Federal Registration Service.
A Short History of the Duma
The first Duma elections in the history of Russia were held on December 12, 1993, under a temporary provision confirmed by order of President Boris Yeltsin.
Of 35 electoral associations wishing to take part in the elections, only 13 of them gathered the 100,000 signatures necessary for it. Eight of them overcame the five-percent barrier. The Russia's Choice bloc was favored to win with ten members of the Russian government, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Egor Gaidar, in it. However, the LDPR experienced a sensational win, taking almost 23 percent of the vote by party list. Russia's Choice came in second with 15.5 percent. The CPRF came in third with 12.4 percent. In addition to them, the Women of Russia (8.1%), Agrarian Party (8%), Yavlinksy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc (7.9%), Party of Russian Unity and Agreement headed by deputy prime minister Sergey Shakhrai (6.7%) and Democratic Party of Russia headed by Nikolay Travkin (5.5%) were represented in the parliament.
Sixty-nine parties, movements and blocs declared their intentions of running in the Duma elections of December 17, 1995. Forty-three of them gathered the 200,000 signatures required by law, but only four of them received over 5 percent of the vote and were able to enter the Duma. The party of power at the time was the Our Home Is Russia movement, but the CPRF was favored to win from the beginning, and it received 22.3 percent of the vote, taking support away from second-place LDPR (11.2%). Our Home Is Russia came in third with 10.1 percent, surpassing only Yabloko, which garnered 6.9 percent.
Elections to the third Duma took place on December 19, 1999. Thirty-seven electoral associations intended to run, and 26 of them were included on the ballot. Six of them overcame the five-percent barrier. The Communists were, as usual, given the highest chances, but the interregional Unity (Bear) movement, founded by the Kremlin just three months earlier, gave the CPRF stiff competition. Unity's popularity came thanks to the bloc's leader, Minister of Emergency Situations Sergey Shoigu, and the support of the prime minister at the time Vladimir Putin. The CPRF nonetheless won, with 24.3 percent of the votes. But Unity received 23.3 percent, and was able to form a pro-presidential coalition in the Duma that over time took key committees away from the Communists and gave the Kremlin full control over the Duma for the first time. The Fatherland – All Russia bloc contributed to that victory, even though it had been among the chief opponents of Unity in the 1996 elections, with 13.3 percent of the votes and third place. Later, the two bloc formed the United Russia party. The Union of Right Forces (8.5%), the Zhirinovsky bloc, formed by the liberal democrats after the LDPR was removed from the ballot (6%) and Yabloko (5.9%) occupied places four through six.
In the fourth Duma, elected December 7, 2003, United Russia, presenting itself as the “Putin's party” attained a firm victory with 37.6 percent of the vote. By attracting independent members from single-mandate districts, United Russia was almost able to double its numbers and as a result achieved a constitutional majority of more than 300 of the 450 seats. There were no real competitors to the party. The Communists had received just 12.6 percent of the vote and the LDPR returned to its 1995 level of 11.5 percent. But there were still surprises to be had. The first of them was the success of the new Rodina bloc, which received 9 percent of the vote with a position of moderate nationalism. The second surprise was the collapse of the democrats. Neither Yabloko nor the Union of Right Forces made it into the Duma, receiving only 4.3 and 4 percent of the vote.
Restricted to the Point of Prohibition
The latest Duma elections are being held under new rules, which are significantly stricter than those of 2003.
The main difference from previous parliamentary elections is that the fifth Duma will be elected exclusively from party lists, while half of the parliamentarians in the four previous Dumas were elected from single-mandate districts. The barrier for entrance to the Duma has been raised from 5 to 7 percent.
The requirements for the parties have been made stricter as well. Now the minimum membership is 50,000, up from the previous 10,000. The parliamentary majority, that is, United Russia, prohibited the creation of electoral blocs and the advancement of members of one party on the party list of another to prevent candidates from avoiding the new requirements through the unification of small parties. Citizens without party affiliation who want to run for the Duma first have to collect written recommendations from at least ten party members and then prove to the members of their election party conference that they will be more useful in the Duma than actual party members. The process for registering candidates has also become more complex due to new for providing the Central Elections Committee notarized copies of documents confirming the candidate's identity, biography and information about income and property holdings. As before, the CEC can bar a potential candidate for incomplete documentation. There are new restrictions as well. Candidates will be barred for having dual citizenship or for outstanding convictions for serious crimes or crimes of an extremist nature. If 25 percent of a party's candidates are disqualified, the party itself is barred.
Verification of signatures collected in their support is another barrier for unwanted parties. If more than 5 percent of the signatures are disqualified, the party will be refused registration. In previous elections, 25-percent unconfirmable signatures were permitted, which meant that special companies were not required for completing the petitions.
There is still one more way for a party outside the parliament to gain admission to the elections. That is to make an electoral deposit. But that will also be harder now. The deposit has been increased from 37.5 million rubles to 60 million rubles. (Formally, that sum, as before, is 15 percent of maximum expenditure of parties' electoral funds, which has been raised from 250 million rubles to 400 million rubles.)
Rules for campaigning, which reached maximum restrictiveness in 2003, have remained practically unchanged, aside from a single very significant change. Party members, when appearing on television, are now prohibited from urging voters to vote against another party, cite “potentially negative consequences” of the election of another party to the Duma, or distribute information “encouraging the formation of a negative attitude toward a party or candidate.” In other words, criticism of opponents is now effectively banned in television ads and debates will turn into boasting competitions. Finally, the last innovation concerns election day. While public organizations formerly had the right to send observers to polling places, now only the parties taking part in the election have that right.
There is little hope for foreign observers either. Formerly, invitations were sent to foreign election observers by the Duma, and at the behest of all the parties represented there. Under the new rules, the CEC sends out the invitations. It can be assumed that the overwhelming majority of observers will now come from CIS states that have a permissive attitude toward all the vagaries of sovereign democracy.
Dmitry Kamyshev
All the Article in Russian as of Sep. 03, 2007
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