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When Stop! Fails
// Federal Antiterrorist Law Gets Real Teeth; Will Civilians Feel the Bite?
Last week the government unveiled a resolution "On Measures for Implementing the Federal Law on Combating Terrorism" that struck many as unprecedentedly harsh. Whatever the case, the decree really only repeats what we have all known for a long time now: in the struggle between the authorities and terrorists, the hostages probably won't make it out alive.
The resolution of June 6, 2007 contains three sections that lay out guidelines for employing force against terrorists in the air, on the ground, and at sea, respectively. The section entitled "The Use of Weapons and Military Technology by the Russian Armed Forces to Eliminate the Threat of Terrorist Acts in the Air or to Thwart Such an Attack" details how an aircraft that has violated the laws governing the use of Russian airspace should be intercepted. The section entitled "The Use of Weapons and Military Technology by the Russian Armed Forces to Eliminate the Threat of Terrorist Acts in Russian Domestic and Territorial Waters and on the Russian Continental Shelf, and to Ensure the Safety of the [Russian] Shipping Industry, including Submarines, or to Thwart Such an Attack" specifies the same procedure for dealing with an attack from the sea. Finally, the section entitled "The Use of Weapons, Military Technology, and Special Devices by the Russian Armed Forces During Counterterrorism Operations" defines the rights of the military in the struggle against terrorism.
The "Combating Terrorism" law, which was Moscow's belated response to the destruction of New York's Twin Towers by terrorists on September 11, 2001, was adopted by the Russian legislature in March 2006. The document allows the military to destroy vehicles or vessels that have been hijacked by terrorists if the authorities have grounds to believe that they could be used to strike at critically important objectives in the country. The law provided only general principles for reacting to such a situation – detailed instructions were to be laid out in special government directives.
The government has spent more than a year working out these directives, so some media outlets might be greeting the new government decree as sensational simply because they have largely forgotten the details of the initial law. Because there is really nothing new in the document. It's just that citizens who end up in a "zone of counterterrorism operations" (whether in a jet plane, a cruise liner, or a theater) have finally been given definite confirmation that their chances of surviving such a situation are extremely low.
This has nothing to do with the decree being authored by hawks who are prepared to sacrifice the lives of hundreds of ordinary citizens in order to kill a dozen terrorists. In fact, the authors of the document, constrained by the framework of the extremely harsh original law, have attempted to a degree to somehow lighten the burden of the fate of hostages by giving them hope of surviving for a few more hours.
For example, the decree concerning the use of armed force "to eliminate threats of terrorist acts in the air" suggests that antiaircraft defense forces should attempt to influence an aircraft that is in violation of airspace rules using radio commands from the ground to before trying to knock the aircraft off course. If the radio commands don't work, fighter jets will be deployed to intercept the plane. Before firing warning shots, they will first give the plane "visual signals" that it must land immediately. If the plane fails to respond to all of these signals, the military has the right to take measures to "intercept its flight by means of destruction." Thus, passengers on a hijacked plane will have half an hour to two hours, depending on the efficiency of the military, to come to grips with their inevitable doom as a result of a successful counterterrorism operation.
Those who are flying in a plane that is hijacked far from large cities and strategic objectives are the only ones who have additional chances at survival. The decree forbids the military from shooting down a plane "if there is no real threat to people's lives and/or of an ecological catastrophe." So a plane flying from, let's say, Moscow to Thailand, over the vast unpopulated expanse of Siberia, should have nothing to worry about. But this ban is effectively annulled by a provision that "if there is credible information about the possibility of the airplane being used to commit a terrorist act," the plane can be destroyed without warning. Considering that such credible information, according to the decree, "is defined by officials according to the procedure set down by the Ministry of Defense and the FSB," it can be assumed that the plane will inevitably be shot down, even if its pilot swears that it has drifted off course due to instrument failure.
Russians traveling by water have a significantly better chance at survival in the event of a terrorist attack than those traveling by air, but this is only because the decree stipulates that the offending vessel can be "forced to stop" without being totally destroyed. The document says specifically that, if a "water transport" does not obey orders to stop, fire should be directed "as much as possible" towards its "stern" in order to "force the ship to stop" by destroying its engine.
Nevertheless, it is also permissible to destroy potential terrorists in the water without warning. This will occur, however, only if a vessel "discovered unexpectedly in an area that is off limits or temporarily dangerous for sailing is moving quickly in the direction of a military ship, other vessel, or protected object, or if it can be classified as a self-propelled underwater explosive device." Thus, small boats, motorboats, and individual scuba divers who accidentally sail or swim into a protected area can rest assured that their actions won't be taken as a terrorist act – as long as they sensibly comply with all of the military's demands to "surface and stop," of course.
Passengers traveling by air and by water are not the only ones affected by the new law: the government's third decree regulates "the use of weapons, military technology, and special devices by the Russian armed forces during counterterrorism operations." Naturally, it largely concerns Chechnya, where the fight against terrorists is still raging, despite the assurances of federal and regional officials that the insurgents have been completely and successfully routed. But residents of other regions of Russia could also be affected by these regulations if the army is called in to liquidate a large group of terrorists in their vicinity.
According to the decree, weapons, military technology, and special devices can be used in the following situations: to defend civilians and free hostages, to repel an attack on a secured facility, to stop a vehicle or vessel "if its driver refuses to stop despite orders from military personnel," to give "warning of the intent to use weapons, give a signal, or call for help," and finally to detain persons who were involved in terrorist activities and are attempting to hide themselves. Special devices cannot be used "near visibly pregnant women, persons with obvious signs of disability, and children," except in situations in which "such persons are putting up armed resistance or carrying out an attack that threatens the lives and wellbeing of others."
This latter decree has provoked particular outcry from several commentators. All the government has really done, however, is to bring the procedures that soldiers are required to follow during counterterrorism operations into line with other federal laws, particularly those governing the conduct of the police, Interior Ministry troops, and bailiffs when dealing with such persons. So terrorists can just forget about using pregnant and underage citizens in the hope of carrying out terrorist attacks unhindered.
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"There's Nothing New in The government's Instructions"
Gennady Gudkov, a Russian State Duma deputy from the party A Just Russia, explains to Vlast correspondent Viktor Khamraev why nothing will change in the battle against terrorism even after the government adopts the new resolution.
Why has the government suddenly decided to instruct the military on how its personnel should behave while countering an act of terrorism? The law to that effect has been on the books for more than a year.
The law, of course, is in force. But decrees that explicate this or that provision of the law are also necessary. And in that regard I am very surprised by the executive authorities [in the legislature]. They've been scratching their heads for more than a year over instructions that really aren't new at all, that have been being following for a long time by now, and that have been developed in practice. Visual signals, warning shots, signal bombs for submarines. All of these have been in use for a long time against vessels that violate the borders of [Russia's] airspace and territorial waters. So the decree with the instructions that government officials have been working on for more than a year could have been discussed three times by all interested parties and still passed within two days after the law went into effect.
And what about the provision that allows planes to be shot down without any kind of warning ritual "if there is credible information about the possibility of the airplane being used to commit a terrorist act"?
That's something new. But I assure you that those who will be making the decision to shoot down a plane carrying hostages will make it after all warning "procedures" have been gone through, even if there is "credible information." Of course, there will be consultations first, there will be reports, including reports from representatives of [government] agencies that are charged with assessing the validity of the information. And in general, the issue – trust my experience on this – is not the instructions. The issue is the morals, the morality, the ethics of the people who will be, God forbid, carrying out such orders. Because the way the resolution is worded is ambiguous. On the one hand, there's "credible information," but on the other hand, there's the "possible use" of the plane to carry out a terrorist attack. How can information be credible if it is reported to be "possible"? In my opinion, this is typical hedging of bets by government officials. To have a justification on hand for their own actions in the event of any subsequent terrorist act.
Do we need any other additions to this law to protect ourselves from terrorists?
The lion's share of such amendments have already been passed. A National Antiterrorism Committee has been created by presidential decree. In accordance with a government resolution, an agency, an analytical center, has also been created. The mechanism for making decisions and the mechanism of assigning responsibility at all levels of the government and all agencies in countering a terrorist attack have basically been worked out.
Maybe that's why there haven't really been any terrorist attacks in the country since the Beslan tragedy.
A whole lot of factors are at play there. By this point there is no powerful organized violent resistance from insurgents. It appears that a crushing blow has been struck at the channels by which they get their financing. The main "financial" blow, strangely enough, is the elimination of the leaders of the insurgents – Basaev, Yandarbiev, and others. Now there are no significant figures that extremist organizations in the Middle East can focus on sending money to. Plus the [Russian] special forces, especially the secret service, have gotten their feet under them in their work, which takes time and especially experience.
The experience of the last ten years or so has shown that terrorists have been most active in national election years: in 1999 and 2004.
Yes, the current stability and calm are relative. The situation in the North Caucasus is still so tense that the smallest spark could start a conflagration. Maybe the relapses wouldn't be on as large a scale as before, but they're possible. So the one on whom the calm depends can't rest on his laurels. Otherwise how will things be for us? If nothing happens, nothing occurs, that means that nothing needs to be done. But we need a different logic, one that you see a lot abroad: nothing terrible is happening because we're working every day.
Judging from what's happening these days, we need to fear not a terrorist act but an interethnic conflict like what happened in Kondopoga and Stavropol.
I agree, especially since the press reported only about Kondopoga and Stavropol, while such interethnic conflicts happen in other regions fairly often. But the one doesn't rule out the other. So we need to combat both potential terrorist acts and possible interethnic clashes. In the end, the socioeconomic basis of these two events is one and the same: a wretched life under a corrupt government.
Dmitry Kamyshev
All the Article in Russian as of June 18, 2007
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