Kazakh Reforms
Kazakhstan’s political system, existing without changes for 15 years of President Nazarbaev’s rule, suddenly needs fine tuning. How come? Officially, Kazakh authorities decided, upon finishing the stage of economic modernization, that a more liberal policy will better correspond to liberal economy at the new stage. Following this explanation, the reforms are aimed at helping the country to painlessly enter the stage of mature democracy, favorably differing from the underripe democracy in the countries of “colored revolutions” like Ukraine and Georgia, and from overtly authoritarian Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
By initiating the current reforms, President Nazarbaev seems to be making it clear: although Kazakhstan is geographically in Asia, this country sees itself as a state of special, not Asian, but Euro-Asian policy, uniting the best of East and West systems. And he, Nursultan Nazarbaev, is not another ‘permanent ruler’, one of those who go away either dead or ousted by the crowd’s kicks, but a quite democratic leader who personally initiated limiting presidential power. Let the West, laughing at the comedy about Borat, now laugh at its own inability to see an inch beyond its nose.
So, everything is clear with the official version. What about the reality? Will anything really change in Kazakhstan now? In fact, it turns out that the current reforms are aimed not for domestic consumer, but for a foreign one. Kazakhstan, striving to raise its geopolitical weight drastically and to become one of the world players, desperately needs to present its pattern in “export-oriented”, “liberal-democratic wrapping”. The point is to preserve the vertical of power unchanged, on the one hand, and to get maximal dividends from cooperation with the West, on the other hand. Meanwhile, the West would like to recognize Kazakhstan as a burgeoning democracy, and Nursultan Nazarbaev as “nice guy”.
Kazakhstan’s task is very similar to Russia’s. This similarity is surprising, considering that Russia has the same goal in relations with the West: to “sell” its idea of sovereign democracy, proving there is no roll-back to authoritarianism, but that there is gradual movement forward, both in economy and in politics.
No wonder that the political reforms proclaimed in Astana caused so much enthusiasm not anywhere, but in Moscow. Look: civil society is becoming mature, political parties play a greater role, mass media is feeling more and more freedom, -- Russia praises Kazakh reforms. Yet, don’t the same observers use the same expressions to describe what is going on in Russia now?
The only thing to see is whether the West, that does not hurry to “buy” the idea of “sovereign democracy” in Russian wrapping, will want to buy it in Kazakh wrapping.
Sergei Strokan
All the Article in Russian as of May 17, 2007
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