Arab Studies Center director Vitaly Naumkin during an interview in his office in Moscow on April 19, 2007.
Photo: Dmitry Kostyukov
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The Persian Riddle
// What Iran Wants, and What It is Likely to Get
It seems that the world is continuing to occupy itself with unraveling Iran's riddles. Do the centrifuges work or not? Will there be an atomic bomb or not? Will the Americans strike or not? But Iran is not joking and is not wasting time. Regardless of whether they have already succeeded in bringing uranium enrichment up to industrial levels, the Iranians are firm in their resolution to create a closed fuel production cycle for their country's nuclear power plants and to continue with their nuclear tinkering. It would be almost impossible to stop them. The sanctions, even if they are tightened, are harsh but not fatal, and the threat of military force being approved for use is not very likely at the moment. Would the US do that without any authorization? Probably not. The instability in Iraq throws a wrench into the works. It has already helped Tehran to turn itself into basically the strongest power in the Persian Gulf. Tehran is continuing to turn up the heat on Iraq, wielding increasing influence over the Palestinians, winning a toehold in western Afghanistan, and setting itself up as the strong center of an axis of increasing Shiite power. An American acquaintance said to me that the war in Iraq is not only between the insurgents and the occupying troops but also between al-Qaeda and Iran, something that the Americans are taking into account. And it is true that Iran is one of al-Qaeda's main enemies. It is no accident that a retired American intelligence officer said recently that if al-Qaeda wants to drag the US into a new round of bloodletting, it could provoke Washington with a terrorist act purportedly perpetrated by Iran.
Does this statement hide a lack of desire on the part of the US to take the risky step of launching a military attack against Tehran? Do the American plan to negotiate with Iran? After all, they did decide against the strategy of regime change in North Korea. Iran understands that its nuclear program will suffer serious setbacks if Washington decides to launch air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, but it is certain that the Americans are not at that point right now. So the Iranians are hoping that they will succeed in forcing the Americans into direct talks. The stakes here will be high, and, if Tehran gets US acknowledgement of its role in the region, a repeal of the sanctions, and full economic cooperation, it could make some concessions, perhaps in the area of Middle Eastern conflict resolution. Working against the possibility of talks is the fact that Iran is clearly demanding that its right to continue with its peaceful nuclear program be recognized (and there is still no proof of the existence of a military nuclear program). And this is fundamentally at odd with American global strategy. It isn't very believable that the current American administration will use its remaining time in office to open talks and pursue peace with Iran.
It cannot be denied that the Iranian leaders are rigid and irreconcilable in the defense of their interests. Of course, far from everyone in Tehran considers the current president to be absolutely right, and even some at the highest levels of the government are said to criticize him for his isolating aggressiveness. But there is a consensus in Iranian society about the continuation of the peaceful nuclear program.
Vitaly Naumkin, head of the Center for Strategic and Political Research (Moscow)
All the Article in Russian as of Apr. 20, 2007
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