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Popping the Bubble
// When a Self-Proclaimed Republic Gets Too Big for Its Britches
If Moscow succeeds in completely normalizing the relations with Chisinau that have been half-frozen for three years, it will without question record that as a tangible asset. And it will have all grounds for doing so.
In the first place, normalization will signify an implicit recognition by Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin that he was in the wrong when, at the West's prompting, he rejected the Kozak memorandum offered to him by the Kremlin at the end of 2003.
Secondly, reconciliation with Russia on the basis of a legal reinforcement of Moldova's neutral status (and things are heading in that direction) will basically put an end to the country's prospects for joining NATO. At least in the foreseeable future.
Thirdly, the Russian presence in Moldova is increasing. That is chiefly related to an increasingly solid position for the Russian language and a guarantee of most-favored status for Russian capital on Moldovan territory.
Fourthly, Moscow can exploit reconciliation with Chisinau to demonstrative ends in its protracted confrontation with Tbilisi. This will give Russia the opportunity to demonstrate both to Georgia and to the West that, as Moscow would say, it wishes with all its heart to be friendly with the former Soviet republics and that in the interests of friendship it is ready to resolve even the most chronic conflicts. And in Abkhazia and South Ossetia these conflicts are not being resolved because Georgia is misbehaving. In places where the authorities are prepared to compromise, conflict can be settled to the mutual satisfaction of both sides – like in Moldova.
For these tangible dividends Moscow appears to be ready to pay a not insignificant sum: to publicly renounce support for the idea of independence for Transdniestr, an idea for which it did not hide its support when the unrecognized republic held a referendum on independence last September.
But at the same time the price is not as high for Russia as it first appears. The fact of the matter is that, generally speaking, Transdniestr has long been a trump card in the Russian deck for the game in the post-Soviet space. Just like South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
These aces in the hole have served and continue to serve to strengthen Russia's position in the game both with individual CIS nations and with the West, which is stepping on Moscow's toes in the region of the former USSR. When the trump cards have served their purposes, they can simply be tossed aside or exchanged in pursuit of newer and higher goals. That's what is in store for the Transdniestr card.
The only problem is that even piddling little trumps can sometimes get a swelled head and start thinking of themselves as independent players. And then they begin to try to dictate the rules of the game to the one in whose deck (and consequently in whose hands) they have been the whole time. And that's what is happening now with Transdniestr.
Gennady Sysoyev
All the Article in Russian as of Apr. 06, 2007
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