Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) and Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych (right) attend a military parade staged on October 28, 2004 in the center of Kiev to mark the 60th anniversary of the country's liberation from German occupation during WWII.
Photo: Dmitry Azarov
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Third Time Still Won't Be the Charm
// Yushchenko Fails to Win Over Moscow
Now that Ukraine is on the brink of a second Orange Revolution, many both in the country itself and abroad are turning their gaze to the east. And asking: how will Moscow, which has never abstained from the temptation to meddle in the outcome of Ukrainian conflicts, behave this time? After all, the cost to Russia of preserving or losing its influence in Ukraine has always been and will remain high.
In the fall of 2004, when the most recent presidential elections took place in Ukraine and quickly became the basis for the first Orange Revolution, Moscow's approach was straightforward and unwavering. Long before the vote, Viktor Yanukovych was declared "our" candidate, while Viktor Yushchenko was "theirs." Armies of Russian political scientists and consultants were enlisted to support "our" candidate, and the president of the Russian Federation was just barely persuaded not to intervene directly in the Ukrainian election campaign in support of Viktor Yanukovych. Vladimir Putin even organized a trip to Kiev just two days before the vote.
In the end, however, a total defeat was suffered on the Ukrainian front. The Russian political scientists exceeded the plan in every way but in the expenditure of funds. All of Europe laughed at the 98% turnout – almost exclusively for the candidate from the ruling party – reported by districts in eastern Ukraine. Moscow's man lost the elections, and the Russian president ended up in an awkward position after twice congratulating Mr. Yanukovych on his victory before a recount showed that his "victory" was actually a defeat.
Two and a half years later, Moscow's moves when it comes to Ukraine are less overt than they were. Moscow is still not making much of a secret of which Viktor – Yanukovych or Yushchenko – it prefers, but its machinations in Ukrainian politics are more cautious.
Moscow no longer sets up headquarters in Kiev for the support of the appropriate politician, as was the case with the Russian House of 2004. It does not refuse to have regular communication with President Yushchenko and does not engage him in open polemic about those of his statements that are not met with pleasure from the Russian side. But with its actions Moscow has clearly let it be known that the only politicians in Kiev who will be allowed to play the Russian card, one of the few means capable of influencing the outcome of the Ukrainian standoff, are those who are prepared to take Russia's wishes and interests into account.
That is why ten days ago, the Kremlin delayed Viktor Yushchenko's visit to Moscow at the very last minute: the Russian authorities had begun to suspect that the visit could strengthen his position in the worsening confrontation with Prime Minister Yanukovych. And when the Ukrainian president's wish to visit was granted for a second time, the Kremlin significantly cut back on the niceties, thus giving the agenda for President Yushchenko's visit an exclusively businesslike tone. If Mr. Yushchenko finally gets to visit Russia on his third attempt, his reception will be extremely cold indeed.
Although they say in Ukraine and in Russia that God loves a trinity, a president who manages to visit his neighboring government only on the third attempt can hardly count that as a plus in his favor. So Moscow has again played its cards in favor of Viktor Yanukovych. Not very openly, but effectively nonetheless.
Gennady Sysoyev
All the Article in Russian as of Apr. 03, 2007
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