A Georgian choir gives a concert in the Tchaikovsky Concert Hall during the 2006 Moscow Easter Festival.
Photo: Yury Martyanov
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His "Conflict Resolution Minister"?
// Mikhail Saakashvili and Moscow Still No Closer to Being Friends
When Mikhail Saakashvili came to power in Georgia a little over three years ago, he clearly laid out the main goal of his presidency: to reestablish the country's territorial integrity and return the rebellious republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the bosom of Tbilisi. Today the realization of this strategic objective forms a large part of both the domestic and foreign policy being pursued by the Georgian president. Meanwhile, he sees relations with Russia mostly as a means of achieving this goal, which is why the years of his presidency have been characterized by a curious zigzag pattern: a dizzying ping-pong between hot and cold.
Immediately after becoming president, Mikhail Saakashvili triumphantly announced that as of that moment relations with Russia would become something that they had never been before, and that the heap of accumulated problems with Moscow were on the conscience of former president Edward Sheverdnadzhe. Buoyed by his success at cooperating with Russia to resolve the problem of Adjaria, the new Georgian leader figured that a quick solution (with support for Moscow, or course) would suffice for the Abkhazian and South Ossetian problems as well.
However, he was mistaken on that account. Having figured out that making nice with Moscow would not produce a solution on Abkhazia or South Ossetia, Mikhail Saakashvili sharply changed direction on his policy towards Russia.
The Georgian president knowingly entered into a conflict with Moscow. First he used the speaker's podium at the UN General Assembly to accuse Russia of the "gangster occupation" of Georgian lands. Then he moved the Georgian-backed Abkhazian government in exile into Kodori Gorge, in the heart of Abkhazian territory. The culmination of this tack was the arrest of several Russian officers by Georgian special forces and the blockade of the headquarters of the Russian troops in Tbilisi.
The escalation of tensions was largely explained by the fact that Mikhail Saakashvili had come to the conclusion that the tedious circumstances in which the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts were languishing no longer suited him. That kind of situation could drag on infinitely, which would mean that the president's main promise would remain unfulfilled. Thus, Tbilisi decided to give the evolution of events a good shove from behind.
However, the real internationalization of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts (which is what Mr. Saakashvili was really counting on) never happened. That's when the president decided to again mollify his tone in relation to Moscow. At the end of January, he send his conflict resolution minister to Moscow for a discussion of the question of normalizing the relationship between the two countries, and on the eve of his arrival Tbilisi suddenly retracted almost all of its demands in regard to Russia's membership in the WTO.
Nevertheless, complete normalization of relations between Tbilisi and Moscow has yet to happen. Similarly, a resolution of the conflict between Georgia and the rebellious republics has not moved a single iota closer.
Thus, Mikhail Saakashvili is playing what looks to be his final card: he has given up on the hope of ever coming to some kind of agreement with Russia on Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has staked everything on Georgia joining NATO. He won't quibble about the price, because in the kitty are not only Abkhazia and South Ossetia but also Mikhail Saakashvili's political future.
Gennady Sysoyev
All the Article in Russian as of Mar. 16, 2007
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