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Love, Love Me Do
// Russia and China Sing Different Tunes to the West
The decisions that the Chinese National People's Congress is making at its current session are plunging us back into the topic of parallels between Russia and China. For many years, interest in the topic has alternately waned and waxed according to the assimilation of the "Chinese experience" by the Russian elite, which seems to find much more compelling than strange about China. The Chinese classic of the genre, Deng Xiaoping's thesis from the 1980s that calls for "liberal economics plus political stability," fits right in with the Russian concept of "sovereign democracy." Moreover, upon digging deeper, the Chinese idea turns out to be the hidden motive behind the Russian idea.
Today Russian-Chinese parallels are occasioned not only by the fact that both countries are almost simultaneously experiencing the necessity of reformulating their development strategies. There are similarities not only in their internal affairs but also in their foreign policy. The unfriendly words that are increasingly being directed at China and Russia by American politicians mean that the two countries are facing a common problem in their relations with the West: how to construct these relations to make others respect you and so that your government doesn't capitulate in ways that will be interpreted as weakness on the part of a great power.
That's where the current similarities between the two countries end and the differences begin. Look at how differently Moscow and Beijing react to criticism from the West. In Moscow, criticism whips up a frenzy of indignation, the emotion behind which is along the lines of cries of "but why don't you like us?!" followed by a litany of self-appraisals: we're so open, peaceable, responsible about the fate of the world, stable, democratic, etc. The most widespread explanation of why this happens is that Russia has gotten off its knees, it has become strong, and now gnashing of the teeth can be heard coming from somewhere. Meanwhile, against the backdrop of this geopolitical histrionics about the West's underestimation of Russia's greatness, the Chinese remain utterly impassive in the face of the West. Beijing's reaction – or more accurately, its lack of a reaction – can be defined thus: whatever they say and write about us over there in the West, China is big – we're bigger than that.
And whereas Russia screams, "come on, love me now!", China says nothing. But it is quietly doing everything to make sure that the honeymoon with the West will come. In that sense, the decisions by the most recent Chinese assembly, which hint at the future liberalization of China's entire political system, will be an unambiguous signal to the West: look at the direction in which the country is evolving. Your conceptions of a "red" or "authoritarian China" could soon turn out to be completely outdated. By changing the direction of the country's development, or at least appearing to do so, pragmatic Beijing is focusing not on its "sovereignty" but on democratization, an approach that is fundamentally grounded in a conscious understanding that there is simply no other way to break down barriers in relations with the West.
And what about Russia? Like before, Russia still values China's experience, but only the classic experience of the past, not of the current century. An experience that China itself is rapidly leaving behind.
Sergey Strokan
All the Article in Russian as of Mar. 06, 2007
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