The Successor's System
// Putin's doctrine of power has been fully formed
This year marks the emergence of the trajectory of Vladimir Putin's rule. Earlier wavering has given way to firm tendencies that will be hard to change even in the next political cycle. The logic has been formed for the System, which the president should hand over to his successor ready to operate.
The Problem of Self-Reproduction
The political beau monde spent the last year talking about the successor. But a much more important question is whether or not Putin will be able prevent the fragmentation of the ruling team. Keeping peace among its members will be practically impossible when they are drawn into the battle for resources, and they have different understandings of what the scenario will be in 2008. The dismissal of Vladimir Ustinov showed that the president's plans did not coincide with the ambitions of the enforcement clan. Putin's objectives do not match those of the elite as a whole. The president should draw out the emergence of his successor as long as he can to maintain his position as demiurge, while the elite needs clarity as soon as possible and it may permit a false start in its impatience.
The self-reproduction of authority depends on whether the Kremlin will be able to propose a form of leadership that can meet society's demands. In 1999, society allowed itself to be convinced that it needed Stabilizer. In 2006, we see experiments in several competing demands – the demand for new stability, for social oriented leadership and for mobilization against the enemy. Society is ready to support a leader who would be a Crusader against corruption. But that formula for leadership is dangerous to authority. That doesn't mean, though, that its won't form spontaneously.
In any case, the Kremlin team should not forget that that a dialectical outcome is in store for it. The new leader can consolidate his power only by denying the previous stage, as Putin himself did. It is not yet clear who will fall under the wheels of denial. But whoever comes to power will be forced to decide what to do with the Putin heritage – stability achieved through the delaying of unpleasant decisions.
The Dialectics of Force
The Kremlin team has shown the inventiveness to create an almost flawless system of self-defense using election law, the advantages of power, repressive mechanisms and the nurturance of artificial clones that create the impression of freedom and pluralism preserved. But the cloners are not aware that, by eliminating a liberal alternative, they left a vacuum that will be filled by forces even more dangerous to authority, that authority's omnipotence gives rise to helplessness by depriving it of information about what is going on around it. Nor did they understand that the likelihood of some unexpected form of societal organization increased with the harshness of their purging of the political scene.
This year enriched us with a new symbol – Kondopoga, and a new political concept – “the indigenous population.” The campaign against migrants and the first ethnic cleansing in the history of new Russia, so far only against Georgians, shows that there is a mechanism at hand for mobilizing society against an enemy, and any ethnic group, country or political power can be chosen for that role. If necessary that mechanism may become a means of defending authority, or a steppingstone to it. The group that have begun experimenting with Russian nationalism are entangled in a dangerous game. There is no guarantee that Frankenstein's maker will be able to control him.
The wave of contract murders in 2006 demonstrates that, when the courts are deprived of independence, law-enforcement agencies are outside civic and politic control. Meanwhile, a show of force has become a basic means in politics, which is unavoidable in an atmosphere that promotes simple decisions. But let's not forget that everyone is equal in the logic of simple decisions, including those in the circle of power.
Energy Utopia
In a single year, authority, including the state liberals, has convinced the public of the successes of the Russian economy. In fact, the bureaucratic capitalism that is emerging is a destructive model. Bureaucratic capitalism is based on the merger of authority and business and it is expressed by the emergence of bureaucrat-oligarchs who are simultaneously members of the presidential administration and the management of large companies, and the lack of legitimacy of private property.
The year also gave us the concept of “energy superpower.” The very idea raises questions. How can it claim to be an energy superpower when 75 percent of Russia's known reserves are already in production, 60 percent of Gazprom's capacity is out-of-date, more than 60 percent of deposits are worked out and natural gas production is stagnating and the shortage of it inside the country will be 46.6 billion cu. m. by 2015?
Developing that concept, Vladimir Putin proposed a new world order to the world this year. Russia would let Western business into its resources and the West would let Russia into its economies, and that partnership would be based on long-term contracts. That initiative was advanced after the Kremlin displayed the power of its energy weapon in its conflict with Ukraine. Instead of showing that Gazprom is a conscientious energy supplier, Russia made the Europeans start seeking alternative energy sources.
The Ring of Hostility
Russia has had problems with four of its neighbors this year – Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Moldova. In spite of the differences in Moscow's relations with those countries, the final tendency is the same. Russian authority's attempt to convert its relations with its neighbors to a commercial basis and refuse to pay them for dubious loyalty can only be applauded. But, for some reason, Moscow still thinks that they should remain loyal to it after that.
The inability of the Russian elite to foresee the consequences of its actions led our neighbors to make situational compromises with Moscow, searching for new lines of attraction while public opinion consolidates in an anti-Russian mood. The arm twisting that Moscow resorts to to get their strategic assets only hastens the process. There is no reason to be surprised when we see Minsk (with or without Lukashenko) heat up Belarusian nationalism and turn to the West. It has to be understood that the anti-Georgian campaign forces other states to look around for protection from possible Kremlin wrath.
And So?
Refusing to diversify the economy, searching for an enemy, ethnic nationalism, the foundation of a repressive administrative machine for the purpose of the self-reproduction of authority, deteriorating relations with the West – those are Russia's coordinates in the space of civilization. It's possible that the ruling team's plans tp maintain stability, live off of natural gas, remain in the Kremlin and lull society into a semi-daze will take place the same way its previous efforts turned out. But then an important question for all of us arises: in 2008, who will use the state construction sharpened for an iron hand?
Lilia Shevtsova, Moscow Carnegie Center
All the Article in Russian as of Dec. 27, 2006
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