Participants of the anti-war rally in Pushkinskaya Square, staged by the Eurasian Party and the left-of-centre Russian Patriots Union, display a board depicting US President George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden.
Photo: Ilya Pitalev
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New Middle East
// The U.S. should accept the fall of its influence in the region
End of Era
Two centuries have passed since the success of Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign which introduced the era of modern Middle East. Over 80 years have passed since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, 50 years since the end of colonialism, and less than 20 years since the end of the Cold War. The American époque in the Middle East is also over now. Dreams about a peaceful economically prosperous democratic region will not come true. What is more likely is that a new Middle East will appear that will bring a lot of evil to itself, to the U.S., and to the world.
The coming era promises a relatively moderate influence of outer factors. Local forces will take the upper hand, and home-grown radicals, determined to change the status-quo, will come forth. It will become extremely hard to form the new Middle East. Yet, this task, along with managing the rapidly developing Asia, will be the priority of US foreign policy for several decades.
It would be a mistake to regard the Cold War as a period of a well-governed competition between superpowers. The war of June 1967 has forever changed the balance of forces in the Middle East, while using oil as economic and political weapon in 1973 showed the vulnerability of the U.S. and the international community. The revolution of 1979 in Iran, which overturned one of the main pillars of US politics in the region, proved that external forces are unable to control the progress of events.
Causes of Failure
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR introduced the fourth era in the region’s history. This era may be called American. In this period, the U.S. acquired unprecedented influence and freedom of action in the region. The American era lasted less than two decades. First Iraqi war, a war of necessity, opened the era, while second Iraqi war, a war of choice, predetermined its end.
Other factors are also important. One of them is the failure of the Middle East peaceful settlement process. The U.S. traditionally had the unique opportunity to work both with Arab states and with Israel. Yet, the limits of this opportunity became seen in Camp David in 2000. Another factor is that traditional Arab regimes are unable to resist the influence of radical Islamism. Only the tragedy of September 11, 2001, made the U.S. acknowledge the correlation between the predominance of closed societies in the region and the appearance of radicals there. However, US response (which often boiled down to insistent demands to carry out local elections independently of the region’s political situation) secured even more opportunities to terrorists and their supporters.
Finally, the region changed due to globalization. Radicals do not feel the lack of financing, armament, ideas, and draftees anymore. New types of mass media appeared, like satellite TV, turning the Arab world into a “regional village” and making it more politically-minded.
Mistakes and Opportunities
The main features of the fifth era of modern Middle East are not very attractive. Yet, eras can last as much as a century or as little as a decade there. The U.S. and Europe want the upcoming era to be as short as possible. So, the US policy developers need to avoid 2 mistakes, and at the same time use 2 types of opportunities.
First mistake is to rely on military force too much. The U.S. in Iraq (and Israel in Lebanon) realized that military force is not a cure-all solution. It is not very helpful in fighting against militia detachments and terrorists who have the support of local inhabitants. Preventive bombing of nuclear facilities in Iran would also be ineffective. It is quite likely that Tehran will eventually make its program even more secret, uniting Iranians around the regime, and will damage US interests in Afghanistan and Iraq in return. Even a direct strike against the U.S. is possible. A preventive strike would cause an even greater radicalization of the Arab and Muslim world.
Second mistake is to hope appeasing the region by establishing democracy. Creating mature democratic regimes is a difficult task requiring decades. Meanwhile, the U.S. will have to keep working with a number of non-democratic governments. Besides, democracy is not a response to terrorism. We might suppose that young men and women are less inclined to become terrorists if the society gives them political and economic opportunities. Yet, recent events prove that radicalism can attract even those who grew up in mature democracies, for instance in Great Britain. What is more useful is the initiatives of reforming the system of education, promoting economy liberalization and open markets.
Speaking of opportunities which should be used, the first one is to intervene in the region’s affairs in non-military ways. The U.S. should establish a regional forum for Iraq’s neighboring states (especially Turkey and Saudi Arabia) with participation of other interested parties, similar to those that helped master the situation in Afghanistan after the intervention of 2001. The forum will definitely need the participation of both Iran and Syria. Syria, that is able to influence transferring terrorists to Iraq and weapons to Lebanon, should be persuaded to close its borders in exchange for economic aid and the promise to resume talks on the status of Golan Heights.
Things are more complicated with Iran. Yet, as the regime there will not change, and bombing nuclear facilities is dangerous, diplomacy is the best of alternatives. US government should begin universal talks on Iran’s nuclear program, without preliminary conditions. The talks should include Iran’s support of terrorism and foreign groupings. A number of economic, political, and security incentives should be offered to Tehran. It should also be allowed to carry out a limited pilot program of uranium enrichment, in exchange for the agreement to be subject to thorough inspections.
Palestine-Israeli conflict still has the strongest influence on the public opinion in the region. In this stage, the U.S. should create conditions for resuming diplomatic process. The U.S. should clearly define the principles which will become basis of the final settlement, including the creation of Palestine state within borders of 1967. The U.S. should also enter negotiations with Hamas, just like in the case with Sinn Fein leaders, some of whom headed Irish Republican Army. Such steps should be regarded not as concessions to terrorists, but as means for strengthening US political position.
Richard Haass, president of US Council on Foreign Relations.
All the Article in Russian as of Dec. 12, 2006
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