Does Russia Need Kim Jong-il?
// Anti-Americanism should not be made the core of Russia’s foreign policy
Shooting at One’s Own Leg
UN Security Council resolution #1718 ratified on October 14 implies serious international sanctions against North Korea. However, its initial text suggested by Japan was softened due to Russia’s and China’s objections. Does this softness correspond to Russia’s strategic interests?
Nuclear test carried out in North Korea contradicts the core interests of Russia. This is clear to any analyst, and only the worst Russophobe can claim the opposite.
Only a few countries have nuclear weapons today. Russia and the U.S. have much more of them than other nuclear countries. If the current UN structure guarantees to Russia a special status among other countries of the world as the member of the privileged group of 5 permanent member states of the UN Security Council, then the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime preserves Russia’s status as one of two super powers of the world (nowadays Russia is unable to reach this title in any other sphere but the nuclear one). So, the spread of nuclear weapons greatly depreciates Russia’s influence in the world. That is, the more nuclear states, the less is Russia’s relative military power. It is a purely pragmatic reason, beside a number of other negative consequences of nuclear proliferation, such as the risk of a nuclear conflict, the threat to Russia’s national security in its Far East part, etc.
So, when I hear “patriotic” speeches like that of General L. Ivashov that nuclear weapons is a natural defense of some states against the possible US aggression, and that Russia should but support those states, I feel like accusing them of treason. Indeed, Kim Jong-il’s regime, just like many other anti-US regimes, would like to protect itself by means of nuclear weapons. It is true that the U.S. applies double standards, and often get rid of inconvenient regimes under the cover of fighting for nuclear non-proliferation (like it was in Iraq). In these cases, US and Russia’s national interests diverge, and Russia’s stand on Serbia was, frankly speaking, a treacherous one. However, US-Russia interests divergence ends there where nuclear weapons spread begins. Hampering the U.S. in its struggle against nuclear proliferation is like shooting at one’s own leg, as the Englishmen say.
Strategic Line
Russia’s stand on North Korea should be determined by a few more considerations. Pyongyang is now ruled by a regime which is extremely exotic for the modern world. This regime will sooner or later fall, although it is not clear when exactly, so far. Consequently, the united Korea will appear on the world map. It is inevitable at least due to the fact that the people of both Koreas wish to be united, and Pyongyang authorities do not deny this fact.
Korea’s unification is good for Russia, both geo-politically and economically. First, the new united Korean state created on the base of much more viable South Korea will be more independent from US influence. Because much of this influence is caused by the threat from North Korea. Second, the new united state, due to historic reasons, will have complicated relations with Japan, and will be somewhat apprehensive of huge and quickly developing China. For Russia, who also has serious unsolved issues in relations with Japan, and for whom strong China might also be a strategic challenge, new united Korea might become a geo-political partner, like India, for instance.
Besides, economically developed united Korea, which is closer to Russia’s level of development than Japan is, will be able to greatly contribute to developing Russia’s far east and Siberian regions. The population of those regions is traditionally positive about cooperation with Korea, because the people do not have such fears as there are about the Chinese.
Thus, US line on changing North Korea’s political regime coincides objectively with Russia’s long-term national interests, which partially diverge from China’s interests here. It is definitely better for Russia if Kim Jong-il’s regime falls and Koreas unite peacefully, without war which might cause an influx of refugees, or otherwise negatively affect Russia’s borderline territories. Far-off United States can afford being less careful here. For Russia, it would be natural to act together with Seoul, because Russia’s interests coincide with those of Seoul completely, and where the supporters of appeasing Pyongyang will lose in their positions after the nuclear tests.
Weak US or Strong Russia?
Guided by these considerations, Russia should better support stricter sanctions than those of the resolution #1718, and advise China to do the same thing. China is now the only state able to strongly influence Pyongyang, because China supplies energy resources to North Korea.
At the same time, it is much more reasonable to proclaim Russia’s anti-military-action position during talks to UN Security Council colleagues, than in public discussions. The character of Pyongyang’s regime is such that only the threat of a military action with the possible physical extermination of its leaders might move North Korea to make real concessions. Meanwhile, economic sanctions are less effective because they hit the population, for which the regime does not care. Proclaiming publicly that they will not allow a military action, Moscow and Beijing give a false sense of safety and permissiveness to Kim Jong-il.
At large, Russia’s policy should rid itself of the Cold War principles, such as whatever is bad for Washington is good for Moscow. Washington and Moscow might have different opinions on many issues. However, sometimes their interests coincide, or are very close. Such issues include nuclear non-proliferation, fighting against international terrorism, against drug trafficking, against religious extremism. “Bargaining” is also possible here: for instance, Russia could exchange hardening its stand on North Korea (which is advantageous for Russia anyway) for softening US stand on Georgia (this very exchange seems to have been carried out by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). However, active protection of Russia’s interests is incompatible with primitive anti-Americanism, characteristic of pseudo-patriots and some members of the ruling structures, who are unable to overcome their Soviet-KGB upbringing.
Taking a more insistent position in some issues, Moscow should perhaps closely cooperate with Washington and the West in other issues. True patriotism lies not in hysteric anti-west attitude, but in the real strengthening of one’s own country. Rewording a famous politician, we shall say: “They need weak America, we need strong Russia.” Understanding this on the level of words, the Kremlin is still affected by traditional feelings, which negatively influences Russia’s foreign policy, preventing it from doing what is better for the country.
Alexander Lukin, director of the Center for East Asia and SCO studies of MGIMO (Moscow State Institute for International Relations).
All the Article in Russian as of Oct. 16, 2006
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