Moscow's Diplomatic Quagmire
// Why Russia Must Stop Protecting Problem Countries
The decisions made by the United Nations Security Council concerning North Korea and the "group of six" mediators in negotiations with Iran imply, in essence, Russia's consent, however indirect, to the possible punishment of these two countries if they persist in going forward on their present courses against the will of the international community. Moscow is, however, hedging its consent with numerous provisos, ever faithful to its old tactics, which are based on the principle of persuasion and coercion with emphatic actions.
Moscow grounds its refusal to take harsh measures in relation to these problem countries in hard – from its point of view – logic. As Moscow would say, pressure and sanctions against authoritarian regimes are counterproductive, since these measures will only oblige these countries to cut themselves off from the rest of the world. Since it then becomes impossible to influence these regimes, this move is extremely dangerous. Yet another of Moscow's arguments is that sanctions painfully impact not the regime, but the population, and thus miss their target.
In advancing these kinds of arguments, Moscow is attempting to kill two birds with one stone: it is avoiding punishing problem countries and, thus, preserving the hope of consolidating and strengthening its own position in relation to them. However, such tactics usually backfire on both Russia and its charges.
Once they have moved out of the danger zone of sanctions and punishments, Russia's wards usually forget everything that their benefactor has done for them and go off into a deal with the West in an attempt to bargain for themselves more profitable conditions of capitulation. Meanwhile, Moscow's indulgence of problem countries ends up meaning that they pay a higher price to satisfy the demands of the international community.
If Moscow had turned out to be an effective agent of pressure on Slobodan Milosevic, if it had convinced him to accept Western demands with regard to Kosovo and if Russia's president at the time had been more careful with statements like "we will not hand the Serbs over to humiliation," the NATO bombardments in 1999 might not have happened, and today Moscow would not be nothing more than an extra in the negotiations concerning Kosovo's status.
If Russia, four or five years ago, had brought pressure to bear on Saddam Hussein and obliged him to permit international inspectors to do their jobs, it would have been possible to avoid the war, and Russia itself would not have lost its influence on that country.
If Moscow had supported just a few of the harsh measures taken by the EU and the US against Alexander Lukashenko and had forced him to observe, even if only for propriety's sake, generally accepted norms and laws, Belorussians might have understood more quickly that, under his regime, there is no chance for them to join Europe, and there would not have been such a growth of anti-Russian sentiment in the country.
There are many more examples, too many to list here. The essence, however, remains the same. By shielding problem countries, Moscow is not doing either them or itself any favors.
Gennady Sysoyev
All the Article in Russian as of Oct. 09, 2006
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