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The Ukrainian Gambit
// The price of the question
Any head of the Ukrainian state will invariably follow course known in advance. When he is fighting for power and political points, the (future) head of state will surely play on friendship with Russia. He will promise the voter friendship with Russia and official status for the Russian language. He will promise friendship to his Russian partners as well and probably even obedience and, secretly, the gas pipeline, as soon as he gets to power.
But everything changes as soon as he assumes power. The ruling Ukrainian head of state will make it known in his first month in office, with either sharp or harsh words, that it won't work out with Russian's status as second official language. A few months later, it will turn out that Ukraine is striving for integration with Europe, and not integration with Russia at all. In a few years, of course we see that Ukraine wants to accede to NATO. Viktor Yanukovich just hasn't been prime minister long enough yet to admit it. Those who remember his last term as prime minister recall that he took several serious steps toward NATO membership then.
That is simply geopolitical reality. Objectively, Ukraine is moving toward Europe and away from Russia. To reverse that natural trend would require exceptional political will. It would take a brave person to announce his Western leanings openly on his way to power. And it would take a great historic presence, once in power, to try to go against the geopolitical nature of his country and marry Kiev to Moscow.
Theoretically it is possible. We will not deny the role of personality in history. Theoretically, we can imagine a strong person at the head of Ukraine who could, like Bogdan Khmelnitsky, who could swing Ukraine around into the embrace of Moscow, come what may. But the role of personality in history is proportionate to the strength of the personality, and that's the problem.
The Ukrainian politicians who are supported by Moscow have, by definition, to be not independent and politically weak-willed, because Moscow expects to dictate its rules to them. Otherwise, there would be no reason for Moscow to support them. And to change Ukraine's political course from West to East would require political will. It's a vicious circle. Russia has no need to support a strong-willed Ukrainian politician. And supporting a weak-willed politician is dumb. He won't have the will to stop or reverse Ukraine's natural attraction to Europe and NATO natural spread to Ukraine.
That is to say that there is no sense to a Russian policy in Ukraine at all, other than to feed the Russian political advisers working there.
Valery Panyushkin
All the Article in Russian as of Sep. 15, 2006
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