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Moscow Plays Win-win Geopolitical Game
Special confidential relations with leaders of regimes considered troublesome by the West became the trademark of Russian diplomacy. Both in CIS and in far-abroad countries. Before Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, “the last dictator of Europe” Alexander Lukashenka, and Uzbek autocrat Islam Karimov, there were notorious Slobodan Milošević, Saddam Hussein, and many others. Building relations with them, Moscow firmly believed it was leading a nonlosing geopolitical game. The logics of this approach is basically that by establishing exclusive contacts with this or that enfant terrible of international politics, Russia acquires unique leverage over situation in the most unstable conflict regions of the modern world. Influence is also capital that can later be converted into something considerable during the bargain with the West which is still on the list of Moscow’s strategic partners.
Such policy could indeed be called nonlosing, if not for one contradiction. The matter is that such relations between Kremlin and any of its above-mentioned protégés sooner or later reach “the X moment”. In this moment Moscow has to show the rest of the world what its exclusive relations, usually surrounded by much ado and expectations, are really worth. That is, Moscow has to prove that when it is hinting at its special influence in this or that situation, it is offering high-quality diplomatic product to the West, and not selling air.
For instance, the delegation of radical Palestine’s movement Hamas visited Moscow in early 2006. This visit was perceived differently by the world. Israel and someone far outside Israel said Russia made a royal gift to Palestine’s extremists, actually granting international recognition to Hamas. However, it surely does not matter whatever someone says. Today, Moscow has a great opportunity to prove its game with Hamas is worth the candle. Moreover, Russia can do it on the eve of the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg. “The X moment” has come: when, if not now, should Kremlin use its influence on Hamas and make it release captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit! Moscow could kill two birds with one stone—not only strengthening its relations with Israel, but also removing questions about other Kremlin’s protégés, proving to its opponents that it is necessary for the common cause.
Yet, will Moscow be able to prove it? After all, Kremlin’s protégés showed more than once they prefer to act without a backward glance on Russia. When Iranian president Ahmadinejad refused to answer to the offer of settling Iran’s nuclear crisis, which was so much waited for on the eve of G-8, he showed the true value of special relations which Russia established with Iran. Likewise, North Korean experienced missileman Kim Jong-il recently showed at what he estimates the exclusive relations with Moscow. Why should Hamas leaders become an exception in this list?
Sergey Strokan
All the Article in Russian as of July 03, 2006
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