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START I Back on the Agenda
// A reminder of the grandeur of Soviet power
The latest Kremlin fist-shaking at its G8 partners was heard last week, when Russian President Vladimir Putin mentioned that START I, the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, ends in 2009. He suggested that the United States begin consultations on its extension right away. Putin first mentioned the treaty in his address to the Federal Assembly in a tone and context reminiscent of the Cold War arms race, when accusations that the other side was unwilling to disarm served as ideological justification for continuing arms development. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak said on Friday that negations on START had already begun.
START I was signed in 1991 and came into force in 1994. It limits the number of strategic arms bearing vehicles to 1600 and the number of nuclear warheads to 6000. Those limitations were met by 2001. The U.S. and Russia concluded a new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2002 that limits nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 to the end of 2012. That is only a framework agreement, however, without specifications of control mechanisms or types of warheads, and it applies only to weapons ready for use, allowing others to be simply stockpiled. It also does not touch on non-nuclear warheads.
According to Moscow Carnegie Center senior analyst Alexander Pikaev, the radical point of view in the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush, which can be considered semi-official, is that a new agreement is not needed, since the agreement is a relic of the Cold War and has already been fulfilled. More moderate factions would like to see the agreement extended and forms of control added to it. Russian experts, such as Evegeny Myasnikov of the Russian Center for the Study of the Problems of Disarmament agree that the U.S. administration does not want a new agreement. Its main objection to START I is that it limits the number of non-nuclear warheads. The development of precision-guided weapons is a priority for U.S. military policy. Those limitations are an inconvenience to the Russian military establishment as well.
The issue has political aspects as well. Its introduction into U.S.-Russian relations at this moment is an attempt to remind that country of Russia's remaining signs of superpower status and raise Russia's position in the dialog. American diplomats are trying to minimize arms control questions. American negotiators hold that arms reduction has taken a backseat to arms proliferation issues in connection, particularly in relation to problems with Iran and North Korea. They also link proliferation issues to questions about security at Russian nuclear arms arsenals. The Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia has concluded that Russia seriously underestimates the “internal threat” within Russia and sees Russia itself as an object for nonproliferation controls.
All the Article in Russian as of July 03, 2006
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