After the quiet revolution in the Russian political system, Vladimir Putin is no longer worried about his future successor.
Photo: Dmitry Azarov
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Old State Is Back
// Restoration
Restoration
The latent restoration or the sovetization of the Russian political system was developed in 2005 into certain political steps. The new system, which was roughly molded last year, is designed to revive the state’s domination in all spheres of life, solve the so-called problem 2008 and, more importantly, ensure that the coercive corporation which has occupied political and economic outposts will retain its power.
Once Yuganskneftegaz was sold and the active stage of the YUKOS case was over, the victory of President Putin over the oligarchic Fronde was evident. The abolition of governors’ elections stripped regional leaders of their political weight and democratic legitimacy. Thus, the system of counterbalances that President Putin inherited from Boris Yeltsin was finally dismantled and the field for the comprehensive political “freezing” of the country was totally cleared.
Confident Exchange
The functioning of the governors appointments system became the Kremlin’s main goal in the first half of 2005. First, the new order met with the opposition of local elites and the system was lambasted for contradicting the Constitution. Shifting the balance of federal powers (regions could no longer shape their authorities without the consent of federals), the Kremlin had to strike a deal with the corps of governors.
The bargain was the following: governors were offered to voluntarily raise the question of confidence before the president before their terms expired. In this case, the re-appointment was guaranteed. Asking the confidence question governors recognized the new order de facto. Thus, they gave up the titles of duly elected officials only to become the group of the appointed. The Kremlin thought it crucial the new system worked and governors put up with it and start playing by new rules.
Primorye’s head Sergey Darkin, the head of Tyumen Region Sergey Sobyanin and Kursk Region Governor Alexander Mikhaylov were prompted by the administration to ask the question of confidence back in January. They showed to other governors how the new “confidence” system worked. After they were sworn in by the end of February, other prominent figures, heavy-weights of regions, went to Vladimir Putin. The president met Tatarstan’s head Mintimer Shaymiev on March 9 to nominate him for the post of the republic’s president six days later. Chelyabinsk Region Governor Pyotr Sumin, Orel Region’s head Egor Stroev, Kemerovo Region Governor Aman Tuleev and even Samara Region’s leader Konstantin Titov visited Vladimir Putin in March and April despite recent disputes with the Kremlin
This sequence of re-appointments revealed another aspect of the deal. The new order in fact lifted the restriction for a number of terms in office stipulated for by elections laws. Thus, the regional leaders who had already enjoyed two or three terms got a chance to prolong their powers. So, the norm for the definite number of terms in office never worked in Russia. The first stage of Putin’s federal reform stripped governors of the seats on the Federation Council but introduced amendments for the second terms to be considered first, while the final stage of the reform abolished the regional elections altogether.
Nationwide Union of the Party and Workers
President Putin came up with an unexpected initiative in his annual address to the Federal Assembly. He suggested that the party that wins regional elections present the candidacy of the governor for the president. At first sight, the step may seem to democratize the nomination of governors. Yet, recent events showed that in reality it is only about the forming multi-party system and the Soviet-like two-channel (party and administration) system of governing the country.
The introduction of quota majority system for regional elections turned parties into chief players. Yet, the very first regional election campaigns after the endorsement of the new bill showed that the United Russia could face the fierce competition with elections blocs set up by governors who played the trump of regional patriotism. A bloc like this came in second with 21.7 percent of votes in Taymyr Autonomous Area, while in Amur Region this kind of party even outhit the ruling party mustering 17.6 percent. Later, the State Duma passed amendments banning these blocs.
New left-wing and patriotic parties became other rivals for the United Russia in regions gaining on popularity after the monetization of social benefits. The Russian Party of Pensioners and the Fatherland showed that they were able to muster some 10 percent and even beat the United Russia if they unite with other left-wing patriots such as the Liberal Democratic Party and the Communist Party. Numerous legal proceedings against the Party of Pensioners and the ban for the Fatherland to appear on TV helped the United Russia to carry the day by the end of the year.
Once the party competition at the elections came to nothing, the meaning of this liberal monarchic reform where parties nominate governors became clear. So that the process go smoothly for them, governors had to patronize local branches of the United Russia, enter them, head the party tickets and care for their best results at the elections. This nationwide entry of governors into regional offices of the United Russia help transform it from the Kremlin election project into the all-Russian party of ruling bureaucracy, the prototype of the new Soviet Communist Party which was directly included into the bargaining system between the administration and bureaucracy.
Democratic Centralism
Stripping governors of their democratic legitimacy and shaping the multi-party system where the elections were no longer a means to bid for power aimed not only at the solution of the problem 2008. It was the matter changing the political system, i.e. transferring from the electoral democracy to the state of the party and bureaucracy.
Tackling the question of succession, the Kremlin focused in 2005 not on the personality of the new head of state in 2008 but rather on the kind of political system this person will adhere to. It concerned guarantees for the bureaucratic corporation to keep power and compete inside it. Copying the order of governors’ appointments to the federal level looks quite in line with the the construction of the state of the party and bureaucracy. A number of high-ranking officials at the United Russia suggested late last year that the party which mustered the majority in the State Duma elections nominate the prime minister.
The party won’t be able to appoint the prime minister but it will come up with the candidacy to be submitted to the Duma, under the Russian Constitution. There is hardly anyone who doubts the United Russia’s win in the 2007 Duma elections, so the real competition for the post of the would-be premier will unfold inside the party. The November appointment of two new deputy prime ministers, Sergey Ivanov and Dmitry Medvedev, reputed to be the most probable presidential successors and members of the inter-corporation competition, came as a broad hint.
On the other hand, the increasing influence of the sole party, which is turning into the backbone of the market and bureaucratic state, may be used later to restrict the presidential powers in case Vladimir Putin steps down. His successor may find himself in another situation where he won’t have to build up the ruling party to suit him but, in contrast, he will have to depend on the party which will first nominate him for the presidency and will later offer him candidacies of the prime minister and governors. In this case, it won’t matter who will take the seat of Vladimir Putin but it is more important which place Vladimir Putin will hold in the emerging corporation of the party and bureaucracy.
Kirill Rogov
All the Article in Russian as of Dec. 30, 2005
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