High Price for Reconciliation
The signature of the treaty with Estonia is not just a step towards the final settlement of the frontier question with one more Russia’s neighbour. First and foremost, this is Moscow’s acknowledgement of the new realities in its relations with the Baltic states.
The treaty with Estonia was virtually agreed upon as early as ten years ago but it had not been waited to be signed all this time. Tallinn obviously felt like bringing about some amendments in order to retrieve territories once belonged to it, though the request from Estonia never equaled an ultimatum. The Estonians thought: if we manage to return territories – well, great, if not – that’s OK, it’s much more important to settle the frontier question with the big Eastern neighbour. Especially, if you take into account Estonia’s accession to the EU and the NATO.
Russia, in its turn, took its time. This country had an impressive list of claims and demands for Estonia, and Moscow decided to take advantage of Estonia’s determination to settle its frontier issues so as to prompt Tallinn to make concessions on an array of problems. They must have thought this way, in Moscow: Estonia is hurrying to join the NATO and the EU, but they won’t let anyone in there with some unsettled problems with the neighbours, that’s why Tallinn will have to pay for an entrance ticket, and Russia has nowhere to hurry up.
Today’s stance of Estonia on the issues that Moscow is preoccupied with has not changed drastically, and the list of Russia’s claims to Estonia remains the same. Moscow is dissatisfied with the status of the Russian-speaking community of Estonia and a tolerant attitude to former WWII nationalist rebels. Constant demands from Tallinn to recognize the fact of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states also irritate Moscow. The refusal of Arnold Ruutel to attend festivities in Moscow dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the V-Day did not make the Kremlin happy either.
And yet, Russia did sign a treaty with Estonia. It happened because the bargain seemed quite hopeless, and the signature of the treaty was evidently geared to the solution of other problems. Estonia and other Baltic states were admitted first to the NATO, and then the EU over the past year and a half. The two organizations indulgently felt about the fact that the question of the Baltic states’ frontier with Russia has not been solved yet. Moreover, the NATO and the EU mounted the pressure on Moscow prompting to it to sign the frontier treaty with Baltic states as soon as possible.
In these circumstances the artificial retardation of the signature of the frontier treaties threatened Russian with new difficulties, first of all, in relations with the EU, which were not perfect over the past years. Furthermore, Brussels is, perhaps, the only one barging tool for Russia to influence the Baltic states on the national minorities issues. That’s why Moscow had to give up its principles.
The time has not come for the same in relations with Riga yet. It is quite understandable since the changeover to a new formula in relations with neighbours and the final reconciliation with them is quite a painful process for the former empire. However, the longer this process will take, the higher a price Moscow will have to pay.
Gennady Sysoyev, columnist
All the Article in Russian as of May 19, 2005
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