Lord Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary in 1983 -- 1989, in Mrs. Thatcher's cabinet.
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"The USSR Has Virtually Disappeared Before Its Collapse"
Vlast magazine completes its series of interviews with those who during the years of "perestroika" shaped Soviet foreign policy both inside and outside. This time our correspondent Maria Kalashnikova has interviewed Lord Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary in 1983 -- 1989.
“The USSR Was a Very Intimidated Country”
When has London begun to guess that a new era has dawned on the Soviet Union?
In the autumn of 1983 we came to the conclusion that the main thing was to begin a dialogue with the Soviet leadership. We faced the task to determine who would head the USSR in the near future, inasmuch as the life of Andropov was coming to an end, and Chernenko could only be an interim figurehead. That year George Shultz became the US Secretary of State, and we both decided to thoroughly examine and assess the state of our relations with Moscow. He addressed the Congress with his analysis of the situation. I asked myself the same questions, and Margaret Thatcher put them to discussion at two seminars in Chequers in September 1983. In general, we came to the conclusion that the USSR was weak economically and that there were people in its leadership who realized this well enough. It was necessary to begin a dialogue with them in order to channel their thoughts and desires in a proper direction. In 1984, I made a visit to the USSR, the first at such level, after a seven-year interval.
What did you do to influence the Soviet side?
We and our allies used every channel to persuade Moscow of our desire to have a peaceful partnership between the East and West. For example, in the autumn of 1983, NATO held big military exercises in Germany. We received information from Oleg Gordiyevsky who was at the Soviet embassy in London that people in the Kremlin feared that these exercises were a preparation for an attack on the USSR. Certain tasks and the programme of the exercises suggested this thought to the Russian side. We took this matter quite seriously and changed the programme, by withdrawing from it what the Russians took for a threat. For they, too, might think of the possibility of a retaliatory strike. This goes to show what tension existed between us. But we were striving to avoid it. And, of course, there was a certain success in intelligence work. Oleg Gordiyevsky was very important for us at the time, for he helped us perceive the thinking of the Soviet leadership. Moreover, as soon as Gorbachev came to power in the USSR, Gordiyevsky gave us very good clues to understanding his thinking.
Thus, the changes occurring at the top in the USSR in the beginning of “perestroika” were clear enough for London, weren’t they?
Yes, but one shouldn’t overestimate the significance of British evaluations and views. During the cold war period there was a broad consensus in NATO with regard to the USSR. It was regarded as a superpower representing a potential threat to Western Europe and the entire West. It was precisely for that reason that Moscow began to be persuaded by Genscher, Dumas, Andreotti and others that confrontation was now meaningless. They all have especially been impressed by the shooting down of a Korean airliner over the Sea of Japan.
What was your reaction to that incident?
That incident demonstrated that the USSR was still a very cruel, but at the same time, very intimidated country. We were deeply shocked by the assertion of the Russian side that the CIA had organized that flight as a provocation. All that testified to a very high level of mutual distrust and tension. Right after that incident I had a meeting with Gromyko at the OSCE conference in September 1983. Its atmosphere was very cool. Later, I met with him in Stockholm in January 1984 at another OSCE conference. He resolutely rejected any discussion on human rights issues and said to me: “You obstruct a turn in our relations yourself.” He was absolutely uncompromising on this issue. And he didn’t believe in the West’s interest in arms limitation and peaceful coexistence. The position of the USSR at the time was hostile and defensive. It continued while Gromyko held the post of foreign minister.
And could you always rely on the American ally?
Generally speaking, we were slightly concerned with its Strategic Defence Initiative (SOI). There were various versions of its use of the anti-missile defence of its territory, should it ever be created. Then the Americans could have guaranteed their own defence against a Soviet attack, and their desire to defend Europe would have become weaker. But during the cold war this was not a real danger, inasmuch as SOI only remained an experimental idea. I don’t think that many people believe in it ever being implemented. Anyway, when Margaret Thatcher visited Washington she insistently demanded that the USA remain loyal to the idea and practice of nuclear containment. Otherwise, the reliability of Europe’s defence would have been undermined.
At the Reagan – Gorbachev summit at Reykjyavik there was a moment when the former was ready to renounce nuclear weapon. Mrs. Thatcher immediately got in touch with the American side. She insisted on the need to adhere to the former positions until the Soviet threat existed. The West worked for the reduction of conventional arms precisely for the purpose of preserving the prospect for nuclear containment. This situation should persist until SOI is really implemented. It was possible to orient Reagan correctly.
Why did NATO approve SOI?
It was done in order to bring constant economic and technological pressure to bear on the USSR. As a result, Moscow admitted that it was no longer able to retain control over Central Europe and its Warsaw Treaty allies. Prior to Hungary’s opening its western border and the destruction of the Berlin Wall, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze realized that they were unable to keep these countries hostage.
And did you try to sound the position of the USSR’s allies?
I visited all of them in 1984 – 1985 in order to discuss the breakthrough in arms control and persuade the Soviet leaders in the serious nature of our intentions. They mainly answered like this: “You better ask the Russians themselves, we are only their junior partners and cannot do anything with them.” Jaruzelski said to me: “You British have discarded the great-power sentiments and intentions recently and I think you are better able to influence the course of thinking in the Kremlin. I cannot do this myself. Of course, I am a patriot and would very much like to have a serious influence in the interests of Poland, but I cannot change anything radically.” That was the most outspoken statement of all I heard at the time.
“Margaret Thatcher Singled Out Three Men on the World Arena”
And so Gorbachev has emerged.
By means of intelligence and with the help of our contacts throughout the world we determined beforehand that he would most probably be the successor of Chernenko. In December 1984, at an informal meeting with Margaret Thatcher in Chequers he expounded his views on Soviet foreign policy for four hours. They radically differed from those of Gromyko. He had an open and inviting method of discussion. Gorbachev even cited our statesman of the 19th century Palmerston and said that Moscow’s aim was to determine who it could have common interests with and go forward together. This made a strong impression on both Margaret Thatcher and me. The next day we flew to Beijing to sign a declaration on Hong Kong and then she proceeded to Washington where President Reagan awaited her evaluation of Gorbachev. She spoke of her personal positive attitude to him. In general, her role in building bridges over the gaps of distrust was very great.
Do you mean not only Gorbachev?
Mrs. Thatcher singled out three men in the world area: Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev and King Hussein of Jordan. She regarded the latter a very courageous man, and she deeply respected Gorbachev and Reagan. These were very important bridges.
Did you notice any political and human reciprocity on the part of Gorbachev?
Margaret Thatcher and I attended the funeral of Chernenko in February 1985. The head of every foreign delegation was given 15 minutes for a personal talk with Gorbachev. Mrs. Thatcher talked to him for 25 minutes. She reminded him of his successful visit to London. He answered that he liked it there very much and would wish to come there again. The relations between them were very frank, friendly, almost emotional, and they were stable and prolonged.
Eduard Shevardnadze became directly responsible for Soviet foreign policy. What changes did you notice then, as compared with the epoch of Gromyko?
I met him for the first time at the 10th jubilee session of the Helsinki Conference at our embassy right after his appointment in July 1985. It was an ordinary talk, without any unexpected turns. But I could immediately see that he was a much more open person than Gromyko. After our talk he was stopped outside, at the entrance to the embassy, by Tim Sebastian, the BBC Moscow correspondent, who talked to him in Russian for several minutes, before Shevardnadze got into his car. I cannot imagine a similar situation with Gromyko.
Some time later I went to Mozambique and met with the then foreign minister Chissano who just returned from Moscow where he had a long talk with Shevardnadze, for about half a day. In the evening he planned to go to the Bolshoi Theatre. Shevardnadze asked him whether he really wished to go there, because he wanted to continue talking to him. Chissano agreed and Shevardnadze spent a whole evening with him asking about the errors of Soviet policy in Africa. It’s well nigh impossible to imagine a similar situation with Gromyko, in violation of the protocol.
What was your attitude to the well-known concept of the “Common European Home”?
I warned against the emergence of a “common European country house” under Soviet influence. I demanded all the time that the West should not change its formula of victory. It was only our staunch position that had led to reaching progress in the question of medium-range missiles, Afghanistan, OSCE, etc. There should have been no new Marshall plans and no free concessions.
Did you feel the presence of any pro-Moscow lobby in Britain?
We had a very aggressive pro-Soviet lobby in our country. I knew of the presence of the extreme left forces in our domestic policy which were fighting against nuclear weapons. But that lobby hadn’t any considerable influence in politics, although it created a potential risk for national security. Incidentally, my mother, during the war against Hitler, helped develop Anglo-Soviet friendship. We organized concerts and collected money for the Soviet Union. At that time each one of us was kind of a member of the pro-Soviet lobby.
“The Collapse of the USSR Was Not in Our Direct Plans”
Were the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the USSR unexpected for you?
You know, the Soviet Union and its bloc were like an autumn leaf: everybody knows that it will fall, but not exactly when. The main aim at the time was to put an end to Soviet domination over Central Europe. Speaking at Oxford in 1985, I only called on the USSR to pull down the Berlin Wall and raise the iron curtain. The collapse of the USSR was not in our direct plans. Nobody thought at the time that everything would happen so dramatically.
What was the cause of your mistake? Didn’t you have enough sources of information?
No, there was everything necessary. Neither were there crude mistakes in intelligence analyses. Rather, the intelligence service was not bold enough to state openly that the end was near. Special services and politicians were so used to the existence of the two rival superpowers that they didn’t dare make the last decisive intellectual leap. It was difficult to imagine that the USSR is no more. Our experts believe in retrospect that nobody dared report to the top that the days of he USSR were numbered. There is another aspect. Intellectual culture in the diplomatic and intelligence communities were such that there could be no perception of a changed USSR. Meanwhile, “glasnost” and elections had changed it so profoundly that it continued to exist only as a geographical name, but not as a system. The USSR has virtually disappeared even before its collapse.
Did anyone of western leaders try to change intellectual culture at the end of the cold war?
George Shultz and I spoke twice at the OSCE conferences in Vienna in the first half of 1989, calling for breaking the iron curtain. The press described us as dreamers and predicted that it would never happen. A couple of weeks before the Berlin Wall was pulled down, “The Economist” called our ideas foolish and said that the wall would remain intact.
Do you agree that the USSR has collapsed because at a certain moment the United States decided that it would be better to concentrate Soviet nuclear weapons in Russia and hand the nuclear button to Yeltsin?
I don’t think so. The USSR had the disintegration potential within itself. It was an empire.
You mean the inner potential?
Yes. Alexander Yakovlev has made quite a few reports, including in Britain, about how the forces of nationalism threatened to ruin the USSR. He agreed with those who said that if each nationality would have its own state, there would be chaos in the world. Nobody knows what the disintegration potential will give Ukraine. The example of the Balkans and Yugoslavia vividly shows its results.
And did Moscow duly assess its position?
Margaret Thatcher and I arrived in Moscow in 1987. She went to the Bolshoi Theatre with Gorbachev and I had a talk with Shevardnadze. He was deeply interested in my understanding of his country’s problems. And I availed myself of an opportunity to discuss with him the problems of Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. He was quite frank in discussing the question of how Moscow should act. I told him of how to find a method of getting out of Afghanistan. I suggested that all warring groupings be integrated in united armed forces, just as we had successfully done in Zimbabwe. I wouldn’t say that he always heeded my advice, but at least he listened to me to have a clearer picture of the prospects. The Soviet leaders didn’t seem to foresee the collapse of the USSR and the communist party, but tried to reasonably follow their interests. The West, too, was preparing for mutual cooperation with the USSR for some time. In September 1988 there was a meeting of the five ministers of foreign affairs of the permanent member-countries of the UN Security Council, the first in the past 17 years. Among the questions discussed was the war between Iran and Iraq. The very fact that we met showed that tension between our countries was lowering. That year Gorbachev made a profound impression on everybody by his speech at the UN General Assembly which demonstrated changes in Soviet foreign policy. So everything proceeded rather smoothly, and further developments, including the reunification n of Germany, proved quite unexpected for us.
Britain was rather wary of German reunification, wasn’t it?
Mrs. Thatcher wasn’t too pleased with the prospect of the reunification of Germany. I think she feared Germany since the time of World War II. Of course, I always supported the idea of German reunification, but I didn’t expect that it would come about so soon. I remember how nervous Thatcher, Mitterand and Andreotti became when the tectonic plates of the German issue suddenly began to move.
Did it provoke any cooling of the relations between Thatcher and Gorbachev?
No, I don’t remember anything of the sort. Perhaps, it seemed because Gorbachev and his team began to devote more attention to Kohl from certain time. The latter sided with Gorbachev and because of this he became more important for them.
Have you learned anything new about “perestroika” lately?
Generally, no. It is said today that “perestroika” has ended the cold war and alleviated world tension. But at that time it was viewed as the beginning of the enormous transformations in Russia, of which the Russians themselves had rather vague ideas. An official of UNESCO once said that Lenin had organized and carried out a revolution which excluded the return of czarism, and Gorbachev carried out a revolution which excluded he return of Leninism. What is going on in Russia and with Russia depends on the country and its people. This was written by the US Ambassador in Moscow George F. Kennan back in 1950 – 1952 in his famous “big cable” to Washington: either the Soviet system crumbles or the Russians find other solutions. I will never believe that Russia could be ruled from outside: it is too big and has too long history. Ukraine is more open to such influence simply because it is smaller.
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Lord Geoffrey Howe, one of the most authoritative political figures of the Conservative party. He was born in 1926 in Wales and studied law at Cambridge. In 1972 – 1974 he was the Secretary of Trade and Industry. In 1979 he worked in Margaret Thatcher’s cabinet for a longer period than all other members. In 1979 – 1983 he was the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and in 1983 – 1989 Foreign Secretary. From July he was the deputy premier and the speaker of the House of Commons. In 1990 he resigned (three weeks later Mrs. Thatcher followed suit). In 1991 – 2003 he was engaged in consulting work for major international law firms and research centres. In 1992 he became a Lord and is now a member of the House of Lords.
Maria Kalashnikova
All the Article in Russian as of May 09, 2005
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