The first President of the USSR, the leader of the Russian Social-democratic party of Russia, Michael Gorbachev (on the right) at the Internationa forum "Twenty Years of Reorganization: Evolution of Humanitarian Knowledge in Russia ". The forum took place at the Russian State Humanitarian University (ÐÃÃÓ).
Photo: Pavel Smertin
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Gorbachev Has Made a Terrible Mess
“Vlast” continues its series of interviews with those who shaped the Soviet foreign policy in the years of perestroika'. This time our correspondent Marina Kalashnikova met a man who dealt with these matters from the outside; it is Lord Michael Haseltine, Britain's State Secretary for Defence in 1983 – 1985.
"In Those Years It Was Believed that Communism Was Inevitable”
How was it explained in London at the time that Gorbachev decided to switch over from confrontation to partnership with the West?
At that time we believed that Gorbachev had assessed the real state of the Soviet economy and realized that it was impossible to spend as much for defence and space exploration as it had been done previously. It was simply impossible to maintain the existing potential and go on at the level of the growing expenditures of the West. When he compared all technological and military possibilities it became clear to him that Russia was simply unable to compete with us. Perhaps, he also took into account the organizational level of our nuclear forces and our determination to implement the “star war” projects, and he came to the conclusion that Russia would never be able to ensure the same technological breakthrough and steady progress. This was why he decided that it would be more reasonable to come to terms with and became closer to the western alliance .
What did the strategic situation in Europe look like in the mid-1980s?
The obvious threat lay in the USSR's great advantage in conventional armed forces. We could contain the onslaught of the Warsaw Pact armies for a limited period only. We had considerable forces for the purpose in Germany. But a broad, well-coordinated attack and offensive would ultimately lead to our nuclear retaliatory move. So, the only effective means against the East's superiority was nuclear containment, and we were engaged in a thorough modernization of our nuclear forces. Of course, this was a dangerous policy, inasmuch as it was impossible to exclude any contingencies and errors on our part. However, the western alliance itself was firm and stable enough, there were no signs of its weakening. Gorbachev had no other choice than to admit all this.
Did you consider the Soviet strategy of preventive nuclear strike at the time?
Of course. The Soviet medium-range SS-20 missiles presented a new and greater danger to NATO security. This was why we had “Polaris” and then “Trident” missiles based on British submarines which could hardly be spotted. American “Pershing-2” missiles, as well as crusing missiles were being deployed in Europe. The first strike on the part of the Soviet Union would lead to its guaranteed destruction, inasmuch as our retaliation would be inevitable.
Did you take into account the fact that you were also confronted by a political system?
When my political career was only beginning, there was a firm belief that communism or socialism were inevitable. Even those who were against this system had to reckon with such danger. There was a Russo-Chinese alliance, the wars in Malaysia and Korea were in progress. Of course, the West had strong positions in the centre of Europe. Yet, one-third of Italy and one-third of France were waiting for the communists coming to power. So, there was great anxiety that the world was moving precisely to such form of society.
“We Believed that the Warsaw Pact Had an Aggressive Potential”
Did the USSR influence the pacifist and anti-nuclear movements in Britain?
Yes, undoubtedly. The Russians tried, through their diplomats and secret services, to support these movements. They had numerous active allies because these movements and left-wing influence were very strong in the European democracies.
How did you fight this?
For instance, we set up a special group in the Ministry of Defence to work out the strategy of debates over NATO plans. We presented the pacifists as supporters of unilateral disarmament. And when it was said that Britain was going to disarm unilaterally, not a single sound-minded patriot would agree with this.
Once, on the eve of Easter and another pacifist demostration at the gates to the Greenham-Common base of US cruise missiles, I went to Berlin to visit our troops deployed there and look at the Russian units on the other side. When I came back to London I spoke to journalists. I said that I saw our men and officers the other day who constantly risked their lives defending peace and freedom, thus allowing others to stage protest demonstartion on the eve of Easter. The demonstrations did take place, but with an insignificant political effect.
After the disintegration of of the Warsaw Pact information has seeped through about the Soviet plans of the occupation of Europe. Some reports have even been published. Do you know anything about this?
No. Except the fact that all ministries of defence have various plans. I am not surprised by this. Just imagine: in Stalin's time, he phones his generals and says: how could I occupy Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary? And they answer: we don't know, we have no plans. That would be the end of them. We always believed that the Warsaw Pact had an aggressive potential. And if there is such potential, there must be plans of its realization.
How deeply did the intelligence of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries penetrate Britain and NATO?
I don't doubt that during postwar years a definite amount of valuable technological information was lost due to their penetration in the western security system. But I don't have such experience. I don't remember any such event which would cause consternation in our midst when I was State Secretary for Defence. But spying goes on constantly.
Do you think that the progress in the relations between the USSR and the West was achieved thanks to the able policy of British diplomats?
Gorbachev had not done what he did only because his “pro-British” position was duly appraised by NATO. The United States played the main role. Gorbachev's meetings with Reagan were of paramount importance. Along with this he met Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl several times, and had also contacts with Frenchmen, who pursued their own policy which was not too greatly integrated in western one. For instance, they tried to revive the West European Union at the time. As to Mrs. Thatcher's policy, it was closely affiliated to NATO.
It is a known fact that there were contradictions between you and Mrs. Thatcher.
Yes, it's true. But this didn't concern the relations with the Soviet Union. The matter was a purely technical one, namely, the rights of the members of the cabinet.
It is believed that special trust between Mikhail Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher existed until the moment when the former came to an agreement with Helmut Kohl on German reunification. Mrs. Thatcher was against it.
From the German point of view and that of Chancellor Kohl there was no choice. The domestic political situation called for Germany's reunification. Neither Britain nor France could prevent it. Even Kohl himself would not have been able to retard these processes. The Germans as a nation would never recognize the partition of their country as a result of World War II.
How influential was the pro-Soviet lobby in British politics, the mass media and business?
The support of the Soviet Union came only from the left political camp. Some people sympathized with the course pursued by the Soviet Union, but not with it as a state. These are quite different things. As far as business was concerned, I don't remember any support. There was none. The same can be said about serious mass media. Yet, in some circles, and we knew well exactly which, there was a sympathetic attitude toward the USSR. But those who were known to receive money from Russia became unattractive for the public in both politics and elections. Labourites had to exert no little effort to dissuade the public from associating them with all this.
“American Arguments Didn't Convince Us”
The “star war” programme was the decisive blow of the United States at the overstrained Soviet military-industrial complex. Were you enthusiastic about it?
Main enthusiasm came from Americans themselves and they willingly shared it with others. In the beginning of 1985 when Mrs. Thatcher came to the United States to discuss these matters, she was given a standing ovation in US Congress. It was only Senator Edward Kennedy who remained seated. But we were mostly worried over the Soviet reaction to that programme.
What did you fear?
Americans always mentioned the big radar in Siberia, in Krasnoyarsk. They said that Russians violated agreements. But we were not convinced by these arguments. Besides, Russians could muster strength and begin to build their own global defence. What place would remain then for the British containment forces?
Did you learn about the programme announced by President Reagan in advance?
In March 1983 I attented the NATO session in Portugal and discussed certain problems with the US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger. When I came home I had a call from him informing me of the US decision to put forward its strategic defence initiative. Can I say that we have learnt of it in advance?
Soon some experts began to argue that the “star war” programme was a bluff, designed to break Russians psychologically.
Yes, discussions assumed a dramatic character at the time. But soon I was visited by General Abrahamson from Washington who was in charge of coordinating that programme. He said that he was ready to sign contracts with our universities and pay for research in advance. I realized that the most valuable technologies would go to the United States and then return in the form of American commodities to world markets. He made similar proposals to other countries. At last I agreed with Weinberger that Americans would finance our research to a sum of $1billion, and we would also receive our share of the most advanced technologies. That was in 1985. Later I found out that nobody controlled what Americans had given us or received from us under that programme.
It appears that your main ally was a great pain in the neck for you.
Yes, Americans have given us surprises every now and then. In October 1983 the Soviets sponsored a military coup on the Island of Grenada in the Caribbean. Grenada is a Commonwealth member situated in the “back yard” of the United States. Several days later, a bomb blast killed 200 US marines in Beirut. We constantly discussed these crises with Washington and the State Department promised to display restraint. Our Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, told parliament that there was no cause for anxiety and US intervention in Grenada was not expected. I was present during the telephone conversation between Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan a couple of hours later, when he informed her that he had given an order for the military invasion of the island. Our Foreign Secretary had to apologize. I took a heap of newspaper clips to the next NATO meeting and expressed my displeasure to Caspar Weinberger, saying that it was no way for treating allies. True, it became known later that the intervention was initiated by the Secretary of State George Shultz, but not Caspar Weinberger.
“Gorbachev Himself Has Realized the Hopelessness of All Efforts of the USSR”
Have you ever met Gorbachev?
I met him once at the Soviet Embassy in London in December 1984. We had a conversation during a reception. He made an impression of a man who was ready to listen to what was said and discussed. And he said one thing which I remembered and which showed that he didn't understand western society well enough. We talked of the press and I made a remark that it was difficult to pursue a policy in the absence of criticism. And he said in reply: “Yes, but you keep the press under control.”
Why did you believe that Gorbachev was precisely the man to deal with?
Gorbachev himself realized the hopelessnes of all previous efforts of the USSR. He wanted changes and asked what and how they could be made. This impressed the West very much. In my view, Gorbachev is not an ordinary person, we owe much to him. But I think that he made a terrible mess in transforming the USSR. I think that Deng Xiaoping is the man whose example should be followed. If one is to compare the changes in Russia and China, the Chinese government has a much better record. Gorbachev tried to implement “perestroika” simultaineously with “glasnost”. That proved too big a leap.
Did the West promise Gorbachev the latest technologies in exchange for his policy?
No, we didn't promise any latest technologies.
And what did you promise?
Of course, we promised investments in the modernization of Russia. Later, when I returned to the government I took part in these matters. Prime Minister John Major wished to help Russian modernization and he entrusted me with issuing big export credits for the purpose. I adhered to a rather harsh position, claiming that it was not permissible to spend the money of British taxpayers until we knew that the investments would be recompensed. We did not sign any significant contract at the time. Eventually, we succeeded in supplying equipment for cigarette production, which was quite a big branch. But it was very difficult to have business dealings with the Russian government in the early 1990s. We were unable to make Russians offer us sound investment schemes.
And so you maintain that the cold war has ultimately been won.
In terms of doctrinal aspects of governing society which was practiced in Russia, I will say “Yes.” Marxismn-Leninism is dead, absolutely dead, never to return.
Lord Michael Heseltine, b. March 21, 1933, in Wales. He received education at Pembroke College, Oxford. He was engaged in real estate business and then headed the “Haymarket” Co. publishing business periodicals. In 1966 he was elected to parliament from the Conservative party. In 1970 he became a member of the cabinet. In 1974 – 1979 he was the shadow secretary for industry and in 1979 the secretary for environment. In 1983 – 1985 he was the state secretary for defence. In 1990 he tried to become the leader of the Tory party but only succeeded in the removal of Mrs. Thatcher and became the secretary for environment in John Major's government. From 1992 he was the head of the Board of Trade and in 1995 became the vice premier. He left parliament in 2001 and continues to do publishing business.
Interviews with Alexander Yakovlev in No 8, Oleg Grinevsky in No 9, Georgy Korniyenko in No 10, Dmitry Yazov in No 11, Matvey Burlakov in No 12, Vladimir Lobov in No 13, Valentin Falin in No 14, Ivan Aboimov in No 15, Leonid Zamyatin in No 16.
All the Article in Russian as of May 02, 2005
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