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The Country's Leadership Regarded the GDR as Self-supporting Unit”
Vlast magazine continues its series of interviews with people who shaped the foreign policy of the USSR during the years of “perestroika”. This time the Vlast correspondent Marina Kalashnikova met with the former deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR,Ivan Aboimov.
“Somebody Prompted Shevardnadze to Invite Me and He Did It”
During “perestroika” you were first appointed head of the personnel department of the Foreign Ministry, and then you became a deputy minister. How did you get these key posts?
I was the envoy in Budapest, Hungary. Suddenly there was a phone call from Moscow asking me to come there and then. I went straight to the ministry where the Minister Shevardnadze offered me the post of the head of the personnel department. My colleagues asked me whether he knew me before, but I said he didn't. Neither do I guess how all this happened even now.
As far as I know, you had to deal much with the German problem.
Yes, in 1989 the situation there steadily deteriorated. The question “What to do next?” was discussed at the Politburo. Shevardnadze gathered his deputies and said something should be done. I informed the meeting that a working group was being set up at the ministry, including three deputies, Kovalev, Adamishin and I, as well as the head of the German department, Alexander Bondarenko, and experts on the German problem. The task facing the group was to prepare new initiatives for solving the German question. We recognized the need for Germany's reunification in the future, step by step. But all our proposals were rejected by the Minister because they were of an evolutionary character, but not envisaged drastic measures. Finally, a compromise variant was prepared. Kovalev told us that he signed the document and sent it to Politburo. Neither I or anybody else knows the fate of that memorandum.
Who put forward the initiative with regard to Germany, Gorbachev himself?
The initiative emerged under pressure from the West. Our leadership regarded the German Democratic Republic as a self-supporting unit. We did not render any assistance, even on a human basis, to the GDR leaders. Perhaps, it was due to Honecker's rejection of the “perestroika” ideas. He wasn't a foolish man and understood quite well that his country would lose much because of “perestroika”. This is why the Soviet leadership had a critical attitude to him. I was one of the Soviet delegation to take part in the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the GDR and participated in negotiations. We tried to positively assess our own measures and thus induce the Germans to undertake similar actions.
Did you have a feeling that everything would collapse in some two weeks time?
No, there was no such feeling.
And even after Hungary opened its border with Austria in the summer of 1989 and a stream of refugees rushed from the GDR to FRG? Incidentally, it also took Moscow unawares…
It was quite unexpected for us. At the time Hungary was ruled by the communists and they adopted this decision without consultations either with us or with the GDR. I think they had close contacts with the West German leaders. However, even after that, very few people believed that the Berlin Wall would crumble very soon. Our proposals boiled down to one major condition: if Germany's unification does take place, the united German state should withdraw from the military structure of NATO.
Did you believe in the feasibility of such variant?
In any case, the unification of Germany was such an important issue for the Federal Republic that its leaders were ready to bargain. But we didn't put forward any proposals.
“Costs Were Fixed on the Basis of General Vote”
How would you explain Gorbachev's stand on international issues at the time?
Gorbachev was confused in the matters he dealt with. At first he sincerely wanted to improve the domestic situation, but soon it became clear that he had no clearcut idea of what to do and how. He declared many things, especially in the economy: now acceleration, now higher quality, now something else. Having drowned in them he willingly switched over to international affairs where his innovations were received with greater enthusiasm.
Had Moscow any consistent policy toward East Europe?
Documents of global significance were not adopted, except Gorbachev's speeches and statements at the communist party congress and at the Foreign Ministry. Our relations with East European countries developed on the basis of “new thinking.” But the economic relations lagged behind. Comecon was extremely inefficient. Prices were fixed on the basis of common vote. And by the time we switched over to calculations not in mythical transferable roubles, but in convertible currency, it turned out that the USSR owed Hungary $1.6 billion. It was completely absurd. As a result, we were greatly in debt to other countries, too: Poland and Czechoslovakia. The lion's share of our debt to Hungary we paid by military supplies. I managed to over to Hungarians thirty MiG-29 planes, as well as other military hardware.
And what did the former socialist camp and the West expect from us, apart from repaying our debts and withdrawing our troops?
When the uprising against Ceausescu began in Romania in December 1989, we formed a working group which I headed. It included the head of the General Headquarters Moiseyev and the head of the KGB political intelligence Shebarshin. Hungary wanted us to interfere in Romania, because they hoped to solve the Transylvania problem. The US Ambassador to Moscow, Jack Matlock, visited the Foreign Ministry and had a talk with me. On behalf of the US administration he advised us that the United States would calmly receive the news of our troops entering Romania and helping the anti-Ceausescu rebels. At that time the United States occupied Panama. I answered in the following way: “Taking into accouint the turn of events in Latin America and the developments in Romania to which you prod us, I have an impression that you would like to add to your armoury' Brezhnev's doctrine, which we have renounced a long time ago.” He listened to my tirade and wrote it down.
At that time we had a report from Bucharest that the rebels headed by Iliescu occupied the TV centre and the troops loyal to Ceausescu were advancing on them. Iliescu called the Soviet Embassy in panic and asked for urgent help, otherwise they would not last long. I called Moiseyev and Shebarshin and we headed for Shevardnadze. The latter invited Gorbachev, Yazov and Kryuchkov in order to work out a proper decision. And we did arrive at it. The dwelling house of the Soviet trade mission was in the zone of shooting and shelling. TASS issued a statement that inasmuch as military hostilities in the district jeopardize the lives of Soviet people, the USSR would have to take appropriate measures to protect them, if the military actions did not stop. This statement was broadcast over the radio there and then. In an hour Ceausescu's troops beat a retreat.
So Iliescu was grateful to us, wasn't he?
When I became the Ambassador in Budapest, I was informed that Iliescu was about to accuse the USSR of preparing intervention in the Romanian affairs during the revolution in 1989. Then the Russian Foreign Ministry decided to declassify the record of my talk with the US Ambassador Jack Matlock.
“If Slogans Are Directed Against Me, I'm Ready to leave”
What about the negotiations of the troop withdrawal from Europe?
I conducted the negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. As to Hungary, they asked for one year, we said two. We agreed on one-and-half years. The position of Czechoslovakia was tougher, nine months, and not longer. There was a big demonstration in front of the Chechoslovak Foreign Ministry in Prague. One of its slogans read “Ivan, go home!” We sat at a table and I said: “We could start our negotiations, but there are too many assistants on your side beyond these walls. My name is Ivan and if this slogan is directed against me personally, I am ready to leave immediately, but the delegation will go with me. Are you prepared for this? If not, please do something to disperse the crowd outside. Meanwhile, we'll have an interval.” In in hour the square was empty. But the negotiations were very difficult.
And how has the problem been solved?
The Chechoslovak delegation was headed by an aide of President Havel. He said to me that it was very difficult to persuade the President to agree on the deadline suggested by the Soviet side. He suggested that Gorbachev write a personal message to Havel. I submitted its draft half a page long to Shevardnadze who signed it reluctantly. Next morning we received approval from Gorbachev and a week later we signed an agreement on troop withdrawal within 18 months.
Our Foreign Ministry's heads are reproached for surrendering our property interests in the matter of the troop withdrawal.
The fact that we signed this agreement without settling the problems of property was a grave error on our part. The Hungarian side put forward claims on ecological matters and demanded compensation for damage inflicted on dwelling houses occupied by our military. The Czechoslovak authorities also presented claims for compensation.
“Yeltsin Himself Came to My Help”
When did the Russian Foreign Ministry become the real centre of the country's foreign policy?
After the abortive coup of 1991 the positions of Gorbachev have weakened noticeably. I was busy preparing a meeting between Hungary's Premier Josef Antall and Gorbachev. In the beginning of December 1991, I had a call from Antall who said that his advisers did not recommend him to go to Moscow due to the developments in Russia. I asked our Foreign Ministry about the procedure of meeting Antall at the airport. I was told that Shevardnadze would meet him, according to the programme of the visit. The next day I was informed that the latter entrusted his deputy, Petrovsky, with the task. And at the airport I saw that the senior officials to meet Premier Antall were Yeltsin's adviser Burbulis and Foreign Minister Kozyrev, which meant that it was not the Soviet, but the Russian side would dominate the meeting. Burbulis greeted Antall and asked him about the reason for his meeting with Gorbachev, saying that soon he would cease to be the country's President.
And how did Gorbachev behave at the meeting with Antall?
Rather cheerfully. He spoke about difficulties concerning the new Union treaty and the domestic situation in the country. He didn't say a word about the disintegration of the USSR.
Perhaps, he didn't know himself…
He realized what was going on, but he was hardly informed about the forthcoming decisive step. After the end of the meeting with Gorbachev, which was purely a protocol farewell talk, I stayed alone in the room. Then Yeltsin entered. I introduced myself as the Ambassador of the USSR to Hungary. He took me by the shoulders and said it was time to begin negotiations. Then the first Russian treaty with a foreign country was signed, namely “On the foundations of the relations between the Russian Federation and the Hungarian Republic.”
Has it been prepared beforehand?
Yes, but I have not been shown it. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry worked on it through its Moscow Embassy with the Russian Foreign Ministry.
“The President of Hungary Is Embarrassed. I Fall Into a Trance”
Many mishaps in our new international practice are connected with the policy of sovereignty granted to the republics of Russia by Yeltsin. Have you witnessed them?
In 1993 I accompanied the President of Hungary, Arpad Gonsz, on visits to our Finno-Ugric repuiblics. The President of the Republic of Komi, Spiridonov, receiving the Hungarian President, said that on the following day the signing of a treaty on the relations of the Republiuc of Komi with Hungary would take place. This was an inter-state treaty and I asked the Hungarinan Ambassador whether it was agreed on with our Foreign Ministry. He said it was not his business. Then I asked him whether he informed the head of the Republic of Komi that he did not advise our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Again “No.” Then I came up to Spiridonov and explained the situation to him. He was simply lost. I spoke to the President of Hungary Arpad Gonsz and explain the situation to him. As a result, the negotiations did take place, but the treaty was not signed.
In the Republic of Mordovia the situation was about the same. It turned out that they prepared an agreement on economic cooperation. President Gonsz insisted on signing it.
When we returned to Moscow we were invited to the Kremlin for a meeting with Yeltsin. Our deputy Foreign Minister Churkin met us first, greeted the Hungarian President and said that, according to information, the Hungarian delegation signed a number of documents and made several statements which could be regarded instigating. The President of Hungary was embarrassed, I fell into a trance. A little later, when President Yeltsin and President Gonsz met everything was put to order and no misunderstanding remained.
Yet, Arpad Gonsz was impressed a great deal by these diplomatic blunders. On our way to Tatarstan aboard a plane he invited me to sit beside him and we had a big glass of brandy. In Tatarstan we were met by Pesident Shaimiyev and taken to his country residence. While there I heard how the Hungarian Ambassador standing not far from me discussed the text of a communique with the Foreign Minister of Tatarstan. After all we have gone through!... I said: “There can be no communique, nothing official, only a press release. Communique is a document of interstate relations.”
But Shaimiyev is an experienced politician.
But it was not he who prepared the document. When they informed him of an embarrassing situation, he said that they should do what I would tell them. And the question was thus resolved. The cause of all these pitfalls was Yeltsin's offer to the Russian Federation's republics to take as much sovereignty as they could “carry with them”. And diplomats and the Foreign Ministry were sometimes forced to smooth down the embarrassing situations.
Read interview with Alxander Yakovlev in No. 8, Oleg Grinevsky in No 9, Georgy Korniyenko in No. 10, Dmitry Yazov in No. 11, Matvei Burlakov in No. 12, Vladimir Lobov in No. 13, Valentin Falin in No. 14.
Ivan Aboimov, born on November 6, 1936, and lived in Latvia from the age of 10. He graduated from the Liepaja Pedagogical Institute and the Higher Diplomatic School of the USSR Foreign Ministry. In 1962 – 1972 he worked in Komsomol and Communist Party bodies of Latvia. From 1972 he held diplomatic posts abroad and in the USSR. In 1986 – 1988 he headed the personnel department of the Foreign Ministry, in 1988 – 1990 was a deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1990 – 1996 the Ambassador to Hungary. In 1997 – 1999 he was the Ambassador to Finland, and in 1999 – 2001 the Ambassador to Ukraine. He knows Hungarian, English, German and Latvian. He is married, has a son, daughter and two grandchildren.
All the Article in Russian as of Apr. 18, 2005
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Photo: Alexey Kudenko