General Colonel Matvey Burlakov during the interview in his house
Photo: Alexey Kudenko
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All They Had to Do Was Give the Signal
Vlast economic weekly is continuing its series of interviews with people who had an impact on the foreign policy of the USSR. Colonel General Matvey Burlakov tells correspondent Marina Kalashnikova how the Soviet forces' groups were withdrawn from Europe.
The shells were in the tanks. They just had to be loaded and fired.
When did you understand that the Cold War had been lost?
When we signed the documents on the withdrawal of our forces from Europe. I knew immediately that that was the end.
There was the concept of the preventative strike in the USSR. Were we ready to strike first if tensions increased?
Of course. What else? Wait for them to strike us?
Did it come to that?
The height of the Cold War was at the beginning of the 1980s. All they had to do was give the signal and everything would have gone off. Everything was battle-ready. The shells were in the tanks. They just had to be loaded and fired. We would have burned and destroyed everything they had. I mean military target, not cities. I often met with chairman of the NATO military committee Klaus Naumann He asked me once, “I saw the plans for the army of the GDR [East Germany] that you approved. Why haven't you begun your advance?” We tried to keep those plans in hand but someone secretly copied them. And Naumann agreed that we could reach the English Channel within a week. I told him, “We are not aggressors. Why should we go up against you? We have always waited for you to begin.”
So you were preparing for war in the early 1980s?
We weren't just preparing. We were prepared! Marshall Ogarkov set up four strategic sectors for waging an offensive war. The Western one was in Legnica, Poland, and Smolensk. The Southwestern one was in Chisinau, the Southern in Baku, the Far Eastern (Chinese) was in Ulan-Ude. Hungary (the Southern Group) went along with the Kiev and Odessa Districts. We were to crush the south o Europe, including Italy. The Joint Staff still has those plans. They may still come in handy. Everything is worked out in them, although some of it has to be elaborated.
Was the use of nuclear weapons planned for?
Of course.
We would have struck first?
Of course.
Foreign Minister Gromyko said that the USSR would not use nuclear weapons first.
He said one thing and the military thought another. We are the ones who are responsible for wars.
Isn't the political leadership responsible for waging war?
The political leadership – Gorbachev and the others – betrayed the Soviet Union. The Americans bought them.
How did they buy them? They didn't give them bribes.
Not into the hand. But they bought them. In Europe, Gorbachev became the Number One German. There was always the feeling that it wasn't Gorbachev or Shevardnadze pushing us, but the Germans or Americans. I heard Gorbachev address the Plenum and was amazed. They fed him something. They criticized him so ferociously that he should have sunk into the earth or at least answered them. But they brought him a cup of something like tea with milk and drank it and it was as if nothing had happened. He absolutely didn't react to anything at all, just kept on harping about his own concerns. He was the supreme commander, like Yeltsin was later. What was supreme about them? But they had all worked under Stalin…
The Western Group Had a Sea of Tanks
What was the size of the force under your command in Hungary?
I joined the Southern Group of Forces in 1988 and led it for two years. One division left, and then I had three divisions, about 120,000 people. A small group.
Did you start with any urgent tasks?
The Southern Group constituted a second Western Front. The Western Group was the first Front. My front also included the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia and part of the Transcarpathian District. My military mission was to advance to the south. I was to move through southern Germany into Italy. The Alps would have divided me, and I would have continued in two groups.
They say we would have made it to Paris in a week.
Easy. We had a sea of tanks in the Western Group of Forces. Three tank armies! And what did the Germans have? The workweek ends on Friday and then you wouldn't find anyone, not a minister or a soldier. Just guards. By the time they realized what was happening, we would have burned up their tanks and looted their armories. There was no question about it.
What were conditions like in Hungary then?
Democrats had come to power there, mainly academics. The president was a former department head, the prime minister and minister of defense were former professors. In October and November 1988, a meeting of the countries of the Warsaw Pact was held in Budapest. One of the decisions made there was to withdraw the forces. Defense Minister Yazov and commander of the united forces of the Warsaw Pact Lushev told me about it. I can't even imagine the struggle they went through there. They say that even First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Kadar was against the withdrawal. But democrats had already come to power and the movement began under the leadership of our Gorbachev. I got the directive for the withdrawal from Yazov in November or December 1988.
Did the West make propaganda against the military?
They did. The Hungarians pasted up signs showing the back of a head wearing a military helmet with the inscription “Comrades, leave.” So we made a smiling, handsome soldier standing on a tank and wrote “We will remain friends” and hung them. And they were ashamed of themselves.
What was hard about the withdrawal?
It was easy to withdraw the Southern Group. The Soviet Union was still in existence. Our Ukraine, Russia were near. We brought the group to the border, and over the border was home. The soldiers were, of course, dying to get home. It was easier to serve in the army in the Soviet Union than in Hungary. We practically didn't let them into the towns in Hungary. A tour of Budapest and back to the barracks. We couldn't be slack with them. We were afraid of the Hungarians and our soldiers might have done something bad.
At that time, the nuclear munitions were moving calmly
How did the idea come up to move you to the Western Group?
I was appointed when they removed Commander Snetkov. There had been an incident: a regiment commander went over to the Americans with secret technology – the Strela antiaircraft missile. The commander and two members of the military council were dismissed. I had just come to Moscow for the Plenum of the Central Committee. Yazov and I went out into the corridor during a break, he brought me up to Gorbachev. Gorbachev asked, “How much does all the real estate in Germany cost?” Someone answered something like 30 billion Marks. “All right, you go there and make good contacts with the West German leadership. Try to see to it that the people are not against our withdrawal, so that we don't upset them.” Then he added, “Don't go down on the real estate.” Then it was written that the West German Finance Ministry would handle the real estate of the USSR.
Where was that written?
In the agreement signed by [foreign ministers of the USSR and West Germany] Shevardnadze and Genscher. We were supposed to get everything ready and hand it over to their finance ministry and it would sell everything. To whom would it sell it? To itself. They immediately said, “Commander, it's useless to talk with you.” Of course it was. And for the Poles and the Hungarians too. So were they any worse?
Maybe they were counting ecological damage.
There was no damage. We pulled out 800 machines and 20,000 people who had spent two years cleaning up explosives warehouses, training ranges and so on. Genscher asked for permission to visit the Magdeburg range. It is the biggest training range in the world. He arrived in Magdeburg and called my deputy and asked, “Could the commander give us a helicopter?” I answered that I would rather not. God forbid something happen. They would have shot me. But Genscher talked me into it, said that he would not make any claims for anything. Doctors, ecologists, about 30 people altogether came with him. They walked around and flew around the whole range and came to the conclusion that it was the cleanest place in Germany. There were still crickets there. They had been poisoned out of all the fields and plants that hadn't been seen anywhere else in Germany for a long time. Then the German army and the Magdeburg local administration fought over it. The army wanted it as a range and the local administration wanted it as a recreation zone. I don't know what they ended up doing. I only know that the German army uses about half the land now. They don't shoot, but wage computer wars in computer classes.
Everything is known about chemicals. But what about nuclear weapons?
On May 5, 1991, I held a press conference and said that we had withdrawn our nuclear munitions, although we had a little left. We withdrew them so that nobody could tell. German spies looked at all the garbage we threw out. But, at the same time, the nuclear munitions were moving calmly. There were a lot of nuclear munitions, ten echelons.
How many people were there in the Western Group?
I had a total of 546,200 people. The Germans started paying us Marks. I got as much as a private in the West German army, 2000 Marks. The average was 1000 Marks. It was easier to live on that money and save a little than it was in Russia then. Therefore, it was morally difficult to go back to Russia. Even more so since the Soviet Union had broken up. A Ukrainian said, “I want to go to Ukraine.” But his regiment was going to the Far East. I gathered the commanders and said, “Here's our mission. We are a united organism. We won't divide into republics. We will withdraw as planned. Get out of here and then go to Ukraine.”
They Ate Up the Emergency Supplies
How was morale in the force?
The situation was tolerable. There were, of course, those who fled, mostly specialists. We left encampments and the Germans organized assembly points. Russian, Arabs, Ethiopians, whoever gathered there. After a year and a half, in which time about 150 men had run off, I gathered the intelligence agents and told them, “Your mission is to get into those points, find the Russians and photograph them.” They came back a month and half later with film of how they live there. We circulated it and they began to understand. They thought that they were just waiting to give them everything. But they were getting 400 Marks, the same as unemployment benefits. An officer might be able to tell them something, but there were already no secrets. A soldier has no specialty or even thought sin his head.
How many deserters were there?
About 300.
You weren't worried that they would come home as an uncontrollable mob?
No. We left in an orderly manner down to the last soldier. There were difficulties at the end. I prepared the Berlin brigade for a ceremonial departure. I told Grachev, “Give me 1000 Russian guys who are 185 cm. or more tall.” I sent officers into the European part and found 1100. They were all 185 cm. tall and weighed 50 kg. Their uniforms just hung off them. I asked my deputy, “How many pigs do we have left?” When I took the group, there were 44,000 pigs. Now he said there were 280 left. I ordered them brought here the next day. I told the brigade commander, “You eat four times a day. Every day, three hours of combat training, two workouts before lunch, lunch, an hour's rest, then a piece of bread and fatback, tea with sugar.” February passes, March passes, no movement. They've eaten all the pigs. I say, “Bring in all the preserves.” They ate the entire emergency supply. In May, the brigade commander says, Comrade Commander, they are beginning to burst through their uniforms.” I called them together, and see how great they look now. And they were dressed well, and they performed well.
In 1992, the decision was made to discharge the soldiers in 18 months. I had 92,000 men leave immediately. There were tanks without drivers, and missile launchers unattended. I told Grachev, “Give me some men. At least 20,000 or 30,000 people.” He said, “We're not giving you any.” So I called the Minister of Defense of Uzbekistan. I had known him for a long time through the Young Communists' League. I said, “Listen, Akhmet, you want to train the army? Give me 10,000 and I'll start making them into an army.” He asked Karimov, and he said, “Well, of course.” I got 7000 Uzbeks that way. I put them on watch so that at least somebody was at their posts.
What were the Germans doing all that time?
Spying on me. Maybe they didn't spy on me in the bedroom. Once the head of the main intelligence division of the Joint Staff came and suggested that we drive to Dresden together. Go on, he said. I'll show you what is going on. I lieutenant who speaks German sits in the front. He turns on the radio and we hear them saying in German, “The commander is heading that way. I'm staying here, you take him.” They changed cars three or four times. Then they said something about a helicopter over the radio, and we looked and there was a German helicopter behind us.
How much money did the Germans give when the groups left?
The Germans gave 3 billion Marks for the maintenance of the groups and 1 billion for transport. Another 8 billion for building housing and retraining officers. The 3 billion was an interest-free loan to Gorbachev. We didn't see any of it.
So where did you get money from?
In February 1991, we received 500 million Marks from the Ministry of Defense. In March, the money men called from Moscow and said that we weren't getting any more. “And how are we going to live?” I asked. I had seen some figure that we needed 6 billion to support the groups. They said, “Make do the best you can.” I called my people together and explained the situation to them. “We have to save on everything,” I said. We had been buying potatoes in stores from the Germans to feed the soldiers. Now we started getting potatoes and carrots from fields. We got German money from our joint account at Deutsche Bank. German fed us through that account. I saved so much money that I brought 530 million back to Moscow.
The Germans were supposedly willing to pay 30 to 40 billion Marks.
When we were talking, they were surprised that we would leave so fast. prime minister of Brandenburg [Manfred] Stolpe said, “We never thought you'd agree to the miserable payment of 12 billion Marks to leave within that miserable time.”
They Shouldn't Have Put Yanaev in Charge. He's a Terrible Alcoholic
How did you survive the State Committee for Emergencies?
In May or June 1991, Yanaev flew to Bonn. Yazov warned me that we would want to talk with me. The television n the reception area of our embassy in Bonn, where I was waiting for Yanaev was showing a speech by Gorbachev. Yanaev comes in, already drunk, sees the picture of Gorbachev and swears. He sat down at the table and had another shot. No questions, no conversation. Maybe he was too drunk. Then he got in his car and drove away. Why did he summon me?
Well, why?
I think he wanted to tell me what side we would take with the State Committee for Emergencies. He made his opinion of Gorbachev known. And he didn't ask us. Neither I nor the ambassador said a thing about Gorbachev. On the morning of August 19, at 6:00, they phoned from the duty post and said that everyone has been ordered to be in front of the televisions in the offices. I found out about the State Committee for Emergencies and receive a command to go on alert. But I gave the order, “NO state of alert as long as I am in command.” I managed to get Yazov on the phone after about two hours. I told him of the order I received. He said. “You have experience. You know what to do.” I said that I couldn't do anything any way.
What about the Germans?
They thought that Burlakov might declare war. On the morning of August 20, one politician, Stolpe, wanted to meet with me. I said to tell him that I'm on vacation. But I invited him to come the next day. They told me he was coming on the behalf of President [Richard von] Weizsacker. We met and he asked, “How are you reacting to the State Committee for Emergencies?” I answered, “I'm not. We are taking care of our own business here.” “And you're not going to act?” I answer, “No. What do you think? That I am going to jump in a tank and ride off to Moscow?” They calmed down, although there was a sea of police and reporters around the encampments. We had planned to make a check of the preparations of the second tank army for pullout. Two hundred men arrived at their units. I came in an airplane. Chief of the Joint Staff Lobov called and demanded that everyone go back. The Foreign Ministry had gotten on him. The Germans were saying that Burlakov had come to prepare tanks for an attack. We thought about it. The State Committee for Emergencies had everything, the army, KGB, Ministry of the Interior. You would think they would have taken Gorbachev, locked him up somewhere and kept on going. But they shouldn't have put Yanaev in charge. He's a terrible alcoholic.
When did Yeltsin first come to see you?
In November 1991. He came to introduce himself in Europe and Germany. And left there with me. We had already become the Russian forces, you understand. He did well. Then he drank well. I said to him, “We have to secure our objects in Germany. We have 47 airports. At least so that NATO forces can't land there.”
And what about Yeltsin?
Well, he's Yeltsin!
What is the main conclusion from those operations?
The pullout should have gone apace with the installments. Build an encampment and withdrawn there. When we had withdrawn to the Soviet Union, we crossed Belarus, Ukraine, and there the forces quickly dwindled. There was an infrastructure there, military encampments. But what about Murmansk Region? In Kandalaksha with that cold? I had a French commander visiting me. He had just 50,000 people in Germany and I asked him about the schedule for pullout. He was surprised. “What schedule?” he asked. “When France is ready to receive the force, that'll be the schedule.” They had no encampments. The officers received salaries, lived in apartments, bought houses. I don't know when they left. It was after us.
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Matvey Burlakov was born on August 19, 1935 in Ulan-Ude. In 1954, he graduated from the Omsk Frunze Military School and then commanded a troop and then a company of Soviet Group of Forces in Germany. In 1967, he graduated from the Frunze Military Academy and served as the deputy commander of a regiment in Pechenga, Murmansk Region, and commander of a division in Arkhangelsk Region. From 1975 to 1977, he studied at the Joint Staff Academy. From 1977 to 1979, he commanded a corps in Kituasi; from 1979 to 1981, he was commander of an army in Ulan-Ude, then in Mongolia, from 1981-1983. From 1983 to 1988, he was chief of staff of the Transbaikal Military District in Chita. In May 1988, he was appointed commander of the Southern Forces Group and withdrew those forces from Hungary in the course of two years. On December 14, 1990, he was made commander of the Western Forces Group, which he dismantled in August 1994. In 1994 and 1995, he was deputy minister of defense. He is now retired and heads the Union of Veterans of the Western Group of Forces.
All the Article in Russian as of Mar. 28, 2005
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