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Ever Farther from Moscow
Last year started with the presidential elections in Georgia and ended with the third round of elections in Ukraine. Moscow looked at the CIS with fixed attention all year and tried to prop up its waning influence, while the former Soviet countries came closer and closer to replacing their political elites.
Ukraine
The most important events for all of the CIS probably were those that took place in Ukraine. The opposition, headed by Viktor Yushchenko, accused the authorities of falsifying the results of the second round of the presidential election on November 21, and called out hundreds of thousands of people to the streets. The West backed the opposition's demands, as did all influential international organizations. The Ukrainian government, which had already declared its candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, the winner, was forced go to back on its word. The Supreme Court nullified the second round of elections and set a revote for December 26. At the moment when this went to press, the results of that vote were not yet known, but we have guessed it has opened the way for Yushchenko and marked the beginning of a change in that country's political elite.
The crisis in Ukraine was a serious setback for Russia's position in that country and all the CIS. Moscow had set all its hope on government candidate Yanukovich. Putin himself even came to campaign for him and had congratulated him twice on his victory. That has complicated Moscow's chances for normal relations with the new political powers in Ukraine and alarmed the elite in all the former Soviet republics.
Moldova
Russian-Moldovan relations took a heavy chill at the end of 2003 when Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin refused to sign off on the Kremlin's proposal for regulating the internal conflicts in that country. Their differences were not overcome in 2004. Voronin pointed ignored almost all CIS activities and made efforts to improve his country's relations with the West. That course was also dictated by Voronin's attempts to withstand a quickly growing opposition that is longing for a revolution of roses along the lines of Georgia's. Voronin's westward turn has not strengthened his political position, however, and the opposition sees big opportunities in this year's parliamentary elections.
Kazakhstan
Although relations between Moscow and Astana remain superficially cheerful, Russian for the first time last year addressed lengthy criticism to its key ally. This happened during Putin's visit to Astana in January. The main complaint from Moscow was about Kazakhstan's increasingly pro-Western orientation, especially in the military and fuel realms, and the exclusion of the Russian-speaking population of Kazakhstan from political and public life. Putin made it clear to his Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazarbaev that relations between their countries would be seriously complicated if those problems continued.
A change of the political elite is Kazakhstan is looking ever more likely. In spite of the seemingly solid victory of the pro-presidential Otan party in September's parliamentary elections, Nazarbaev cannot feel completely secure. Western pressure to create true democratic conditions is growing, the opposition is uniting and the ruling party is divided. This last fact became glaringly obvious when speaker Zharmkhan Tuyakbay mutinied, accusing the government of falsifying the vote and becoming the leader of the opposition.
Belarus
Moscow's discontent with Aleksandr Lukashenko's Belarus is mounting as well. The discord is mainly economic. Last fall, Lukashenko publicly confirmed that there would be no common Russian-Belarusian currency, which Moscow was pushing for. Lukashenko has still not ratified documents passed by his parliament to give Russia property rights to oil pipelines crossing Belarusian territory and he hasn't been cooperative about gas lines either.
There are been talk recently to the effect that Moscow has begun examining Belarusian politicians in search of a successor to Poppa Lukashenko, one more pliable and less repulsive. So, even though Lukashenko was given the right to hold a third, fourth, fifth (and so on) term in the referendum held in October, his future is still less than rosy. This is even more so since the United States stated openly for the first time at the end of the summer that it will make efforts to remove the authoritarian Belarusian from power.
Georgia
The year 2004 began with presidential elections in Georgia, in which Mikhail Saakashvili rode the tide of change to a victory with more than 90 percent of the vote.
Relations between Moscow and the new powers in Tbilisi had overcome their initial tension by the end of the year, but remain unsatisfactory nonetheless. And they are far from any agreement on the conditions under which they can normalize their relations. In Tbilisi, they are insisting on absolute equality between partners in deciding what compromises to make about what. Moscow agrees in general that compromise should be mutual, but wants to make them with a view to the actual situation: Georgia has more problems than Russia has, it should be the more cooperative. Moscow's hope for the destabilization of the new government in Tbilisi didn't pan out. Saakashvili is holding fast.
Moscow informed Tbilisi of its views on their bilateral problems in the first half of last year. In October, Tbilisi responded, much to Moscow's displeasure. The Kremlin was especially annoyed with two points: the demand that Russia close its military bases in Georgia by January 1, 2006, and that the peacekeeping operations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia be transferred to UN or OSCE control. Those operations are now being overseen by Russia. These key issues that are holding up the signing of an agreement on relations between the two states.
Armenia
Russia has been taking advantage of Armenian President Robert Kocharyan's need for its support. After the affairs in Georgian took the course they did, the opposition in Armenia was vitiated. In April, Kocharyan faced the most serious challenge from the opposition that he has seen while in office. The government had to use force to break up protests. Even though the situation was brought under control, the president's associates are concerned that that is not the last move by the opposition.
In exchange for Russian support, Kocharyan has expressed his readiness to increase that country's economic presence in Armenia. Russia received the bigger part of the Armenian energy sector in an agreement to write off Armenian debt and now controls about 80 percent of Armenia's electricity production. Armrosgazprom, the Armenian natural gas monopoly is also controlled by Russian structures. And Russia has received stock packages in a number of Armenian defense enterprises. However, Armenia's significance as Russia's strategic ally in the Transcaucasus will be substantially diminished if Russia loses its influence in Georgia.
Azerbaijan
Moscow made efforts to establish relations with Azerbaijan's new president Ilkham Aliev last year. The Kremlin is concerned that Aliev Junior will lean further toward the West than his father had in order to make Azerbaijan a regional leader. Moscow is unhappy that Azerbaijan has avoided making a long-term on oil transit with it and will in the future send its oil down the Baky – Tbilisi – Ceyhan pipeline, that is, across Georgia to Turkey. Moscow is also concerned about the lack of progress in military and technical cooperation with Baku and suspects the new leadership of secret intentions to go over to Western armament standards. These suspicions were confirmed by Azerbiajan's announcement of its plans to step up its integration into NATO and its willingness to allow NATO military bases on its territory.
During Ilkham Aliev's visit to Moscow in February, he was offered the alternative of strengthening military ties with Russia, with close ties with Russian forces and a place in the CIS Antiterrorism Center. Baku has yet to give a firm answer. That is partially because Ilkham Aliev has yet to consolidate his forces fully within the country.
Tajikistan
Russia was able to establish satisfactory relations with this strategic CIS ally only at the end of the year. Before Putin's visit to Dushanbe in October, Tajikistani President Emomali Rakhmonov had been hinting that Russia's rent-free military base in Tajikistan was no longer acceptable and that the Russians needed to open up their wallet according to the example set by the generous Americans. Dushanbe further demanded ownership of the Nurek space tracking station, so that it could then rent it back to Russia. Moscow got the picture. Tajikistan had decided to make some money off the Russian military's presence there, and good money at that. The Kremlin reacted badly to that and began to think up strong countermeasures.
Setbacks in trade with the United States and fear of facing his American-backed opposition alone made Rakhmonov think again about relations with Moscow. During Putin's visit to Dushanbe, an agreement was signed giving the Russian military base legal status, turning Nurek over to Russia in exchange for a debt write-off, finishing the Sangtudin Hydroelectric Plant (with Tajikistan's $50 million state debt to Russia reinvested in the plant in the form of Russian-owned stock) and the introduction of Russian border guards into Tajikistan.
Kyrgyzstan
Russian relations with this Central Asian state, like everything else there, passed the year without strong jolts. The Kyrgyzstani opposition is preparing for the presidential elections scheduled for 2005, and Kyrgyzstani President Askar Akaev has repeatedly stated that he will not run for another term in office. During Akaev's November visit to Moscow, Akaev agreed to turn the most profitable parts of his country's military-industrial complex to Russia against its $180-million debt to Russia. About the only stumbling block left in Russian-Kyrgyz relations is the American plan to station several American Air Force AWACs near Manas Airport. Moscow sees that as a violation of Bishkek's military and political obligations to it as part of the Collective Security Agreement Organization.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistani President Islam Karimov was badly shaken by the major terrorist acts there in March and July 2004. He broke up his moderate, liberal opposition several years ago, only to see a radical opposition fill the vacuum. Karimov remains true to his motto, Better a hundred arrested than a thousand killed. His intelligence agents conduct mass arrests. It's either me or the terrorists, and if I go, the Islamists come in, the argument goes, although it is not too convincing. That is why his position is looking shakier.
Karimov is reserved in his relations with Moscow. He doesn't want to spoil them, although he is also playing making advance to Washington, which is interested in strengthening its position in Central Asia.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan, headed by Saparmurat Niyazov, is a model of stability. Two years ago, Turkmenbashi crushed the opposition. But Niyazov is still not completely calm. In February, a book appeared in the stores of Turkmenistan entitled My Accomplices and I Are Terrorists, written by former minister of foreign affairs Boris Shikhuradov, who has been sentenced to life imprisonment for attempting a coup d'etat. In the book, the former opposition leader tells how a a bunch of renegades organized an assassination attempt on the great Turkmenbashi. Many in Ashkhabad, and in the West too, have doubts about the authenticity of the authorship of the strange confessional. Turkmenbashi has also taken steps toward liberalization. In January, exit visas were eliminated in Turkmenistan. That was seen as a gesture to Moscow, whose support he is counting on if the United States should turn up its pressure on Niyazov. Making it easier to leave the country is most of all to the advantage of the ethnic Russians living there.
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ASTROLOGICAL FORECASTS
The Leaders of the Countries of the CIS
No horoscope was prepared for the president of Ukraine, since his identity was not known at press time.
Askar Akaev This leader is not interested in flashy appearances, but he has great internal strength at his command. Water is the dominant element in his chart. The conjunction of the Sun and Mars in Scorpio characterizes him as outwardly unaggressive but capable of decisive and harsh defense. Autumn will be the most difficult time for Scorpions in 2005. For Akaev, that will be the first days of September, the end of October, and then January 2006 again. Nonetheless, nothing should seriously threaten the Kyrgyz leader's authority.
Ilkham Aliev He can be characterized as a somewhat harsh and conservative person, but highly law-abiding. He has not only his Sun in Capricorn, but Mercury and Saturn as well. Because of the position of the Moon, he may do more than he wants. He has high energy in general. It is possible that the Azerbaijani president will experience an increased interest in women (due to the position of Venus). Psychological and legal problems are most likely to occur in July.
Vladimir Voronin The elements of earth and air and expressed in the horoscope of this politician. Therefore, he makes decisions, or tries to at least, governed by logic and not emotion. Nonetheless, because of his birth just before the New Moon, his mind can sometimes betray him and he can unwittingly be party to the successes of dark forces. He can hardly be called free of conflicts. In 2005, the planets are for the most part harmonious in Voronin's chart. Therefore, he may be able to achieve success and strengthen his position. Complications (not necessarily political) are possible in the last days of February, and in September and October. In Moldova itself, complications are possible in April.
Islam Karimov Here we see the democratic Aquarius contradictorily place against the old waning Moon. The conjunction of Mars and Saturn can hinder this politician. When he needs to act decisively, he is slow; and when he needs to obey the law, he resorts to violence. In addition, he is liable to external contradictions. In 2005, the Uzbekistani leader may have difficulties beginning in the middle of August and meet with the most complex situations at the end of October and in November.
Robert Kocharyan His horoscope is practically evenly divided between harmonious and conflicting aspects. It lacks a certain finality. Therefore, he needs appropriate partners. He is an analyst and makes decision only after analyzing all the information. He is capable of firmness and bravery. The strong presence of Mercury, Venus and Mars in his horoscope vouches for this. Changes in his fate may take place in April and September-October, under the influence of eclipses. Those changes may be for the better or worse. Comparing the charts of Aliev and Kocharyan, the very harshest aspects can be seen that threaten direct conflict, as well as aspects that allow the two presidents to understand each other, if they choose to.
Aleksandr Lukashenko The Belarusian and Armenian presidents were born only one day apart, and without knowing the exact times of birth, their charts come out with very similar characteristics. Here we again see an analytical mind, a comprehension of aesthetics, firmness of purpose and defense of one's own interests. Legal problems and issues of status may occur for Lukashenko in April, at the end of summer and beginning of fall. In addition, Lukashenko may become aggressive or come into danger in February.
Nursultan Nazabaev Only harmonious and creative aspects are to be seen in the Kazakh leader's chart. Problems avoid him. A New Moon characterizes him as a rather progressive person who is oriented towards things new. There is the emotionality of water in his chart, the vigor of fire and the practicality of earth in his chart, but the democracy of air is missing. In 2005, Nazarbaev will have to cope with various problems. At the end of July and in August, his plans for action may be legally blocked. The middle of November will be a hard time for him.
Saparmurat Niyazov Usually the Aquarius loves freedom. But here we see four planets in the element fire and three planets in earth. That is the reason why the Turkmen leader is not more democratic, even by the standards of the former Soviet Union. There are no eclipse or any other aspects in Niyazov's horoscope for most of the year, so there is no reason to think that he will lead his country toward admission to the European Union this year either. Things will remain unchanged, although some sort of cataclysms may be possible in November.
Emomali Rakhmonov His horoscope is reminiscent of Putin's. There is a difference of only two days. For most of the year, Jupiter will be in Libra, which is favorable for the Tajikistani leader, just as it is for the Russian. His sphere of influence may broaden and his authority increase. Complications arise only in fall, in September and October. The eclipse of the Sun on October 3 will bring substantial changes in the politician's life.
Mikhail Saakashvili The young Georgian president's chart is harsh. His knows how to fight and to achieve his goals. His emotions can draw him into conflicts. The general energy of the planets in his chart is not very high. But he is fully capable of facing the difficulties that stand before him in 2005. The most difficult months for him will be April, August and November. If he makes it through those dangerous periods, Georgia will not be threatened with adversity.
Evegeny Sysoev
All the Article in Russian as of Jan. 10, 2005
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Photo: Dmitry Azarov
