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Dec. 12, 2004
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“We Went it Blind while Planning the Operation”
Ten years ago on December 11, 1994, the Russian army entered Chechnya. The first Chechen war lasted 613 days and took the lives of more than five thousand Russian soldiers. The number of civilian casualties is still unknown. Former Vladikavkaz army corps commander General Gennady Troshev recollects the beginning of the campaign in an interview to Vlast's correspondent Sergey Artemov.
“We did not Know What we Should Do About the Armed Fighters.”

       - At the end of September 1994, you were recalled from the mission in Pridnestrovye and were appointed the commander of the 42-d army corps with the headquarters in Vladikavkaz. What was taking place in Chechnya at that time?

Photo: Alexey Kudenko
       - The leaders of the republic were purposefully preparing for a war with Russia. The people of Dudayev had more than 42 thousand units of small arms, a lot of tanks, armored combat vehicles, howitzers, mortars, antitank grenade launchers and anti-aircraft missile complexes. It was clear to my officers and me what this could result in. However, the Moscow politicians kept pretending that nothing was happening. Then suddenly there was an avalanche of cipher telegrams and codograms, according to which, I had to urgently prepare subdivisions from the army corps in my command, which would be sent to the territory of Chechnya. A motorized rifle battalion with strong reinforcements was shaped. It was completely manned, armed and equipped. Back then I did not know that similar work was going on in the 131st Maikop brigade, in the Volgograd corps and in other military districts.

       - What was the atmosphere in which the introduction of troops was planned?

Photo: Gennady Hamelianin
There was real fun in Grozny on the eve of the first war.
       - It was the headquarters of the combined grouping of troops (set up on the basis of the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District) that assumed all the weight of the planning. Several hundred Generals and officers of the General Staff that came to Mozdok were consultants and bore no responsibility. They overdrove the district command with vain instructions, which nobody needed under those circumstances. At the same time they failed to fulfill their main function – to provide reliable information about the probable enemy, the strength of the gangs, the level of their combat readiness, possible character of actions, the leaders of the gangs, etc. Actually we went it blind while planning the operation. It is hard for me to recollect the bungling demonstrated by a whole crowd of Moscow bosses. I do not know why they had come. The fuss and the “overbearing psychosis” apparently did not contribute to a systematic and thoughtful preparation for the coming operation. The date of its beginning was constantly changed.

Photo: Gennady Hamelianin
The restoration of the constitutional law in the city of Grozny took much more time than it had been supposed (photo of 1996).
       - When did the order come? Who gave it?

       - There was no written order. On December 8 commander of the NCMD troops General Mityukhin informed me by phone that the troops were to move forward on December 11 at four a.m.

       - What was the mission of the troops that were going to Chechnya?

       - As far as I remember it was as follows: to advance under the cover of the aviation along the specified routes to Grozny and to block the capital of Chechnya together with the North and East groupings in such way creating the conditions for the voluntary disarmament of the gangs. In case they refused we were to mount the operation on the destruction of the fighters, which was to stabilize the situation on the territory of the whole Chechnya. The plan was approved on the highest level without a single objection – from the first try.

Photo: Gennady Hamelianin
When the Chechen who were loyal to Moscow (photo: Ruslan Labazanov, photo below: Bislan Gantamirov) failed to oust Dudayev's units from Grozny president Yeltsin commissioned Pavel Grachev with this task.
       - What happened next?

       - Then it was leapfrog. We were to reach Grozny and block it. Then our politicians were to take the floor - to persuade or use ultimatums. Everybody thought that we would come to Grozny, block it, shoot our cannons a couple of times into the air, all the rebels would disperse and we would return to our permanent posts.

       - In other words there was no final goal of the operation, was there?

       - The goal was to block Grozny. It is a different thing that we did not know what to do if we came against a crowd of unarmed people, what we should do if they blocked our way; what we should do about armed fighters. Nobody gave answers to those questions. The impression was that we were going to have some staff training - as if there was no enemy in front and nobody would shoot at us or blow us up. According to Pavel Grachev, the decision on the introduction of troops to Chechnya was made during a break of the meeting of the Security Council and it took just ten minutes. It did not look serious.

“We Failed to Take into Account the Fact that the March was Scheduled on the Week-End”

       - How did the columns start?

       - Commander of the 19th division colonel Kandalin who was to advance a composite detachment along the Moscow-Baku highway tried to talk me into postponing the time his group was to leave its permanent post (the Chermen village under Vladikavkaz). I reported about that to Mityukhin. The latter agreed to shift the time to nine a.m. Afterwards it turned out that this was the first mistake. The task force was headed by my deputy General Petruk. He organized interaction between the battalion and army aviation, the artillery, and the neighbors. Parallel to that an airborne battalion was advancing from Beslan under the command of General Babichev. The weather was awful: it was raining and muddy. It seemed as though everything was against us.

       - What was against you and what do you mean by saying “the first mistake”?

       - We failed to take into account the fact that the march was scheduled on the week-end. Nazran's central bazaar, which was located close to the road, was jammed with people. There were jams along the route. As we approached the market our column was stopped by militiamen. An excited crowd of local citizens began turning over and burning cars – they burnt ten cars, six were turned over. It became obvious that our way would not be easy. Babichev's column was also blocked by the local population. He managed to maneuver and outflank them. Later under the Barsuki village the service column was stopped and plundered.

Photo: Vasily Shaposhnikov
Boris Yeltsin
       - What was the reaction of the Ingush leadership to the incidents?

       - There was no reaction. Much depended upon the president of the republic – Ruslan Aushev at that time. Unfortunately he exerted no influence upon the population. He allowed the situation to take its course. He did not openly sabotage the decisions of the Kremlin however at the same time he took no measures to cease the outrage. His passivity clearly demonstrated that he was actually against the introduction of troops.

       - Do you remember the name of your first subordinate who was killed in this war?

       - Private Vitaly Maslennikov. I will always remember his name. On Sunday at 17.15 I received a phone call from the chief of staff. He reported that the column had been fired on from the woods in the vicinity of the Gazi-Yurt village as a result of which a soldier died. Actually this was the first victim of the Chechen war…

“The Officers did not Even Have the Maps of Grozny”

Photo: Pavel Kassin
Pavel Grachev
       - When did the first battle begin?

       - On the second or the third day of the march at the administrative border of Ingushetia and Chechnya, on the bridge at the Novy Sharoi village. For the first time both sides used the heavies and the artillery. Colonel Kandalin panicked: he said we were destroying people. He stopped and fixed a field camp by the Assinovskaya village. He tried to convince Petruk and Babichev that the advance of the troops should be halted. However, the next day at dawn Babichev lead his airborne units ahead. Petruk and Kandalin were immediately relieved from command. Commander of the 693d regiment colonel Vasily Prizemlin was appointed the commander of the combined detachment. He led the battalion on Grozny. However, the trouble was that there was no stable communication with the columns; at times there was no communication at all. I kept up the communication with the battalion through the company that had been stationed in the district of the airport in the Sleptsovskaya village since 1992 (the time of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict). And only then - having received information - I reported to Mozdok. It is shameful to remember that but it was so.

Photo: Gennady Hamelianin
When the deputies that sympathized with Chechnya (photo: Sergey Yushenkov and Grigory Yavlinsky in Dudayev's waiting room) failed to get concessions from Moscow, president Dudayev commissioned Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basayev with this task.
       - How come there was no management of the troops?

       - We did not take mountains into account. I wish that was the only problem. The officers did not even have the maps of Grozny! However, back then we paid no attention to that. The most important was to advance to the city as soon as possible. Everybody stamped their feet, shouted demanding that we should go forward whatever the cost. In that situation it was necessary to make a firm decision on the replacement of the leadership of the operation.

Photo: Gennady Hamelianin
Jokhar Dudayev
       - Are you hinting at the notorious illness of commander of the NCMD troops General Mityukhin who was suddenly hospitalized at the height of the operation? Actually the conduct of some Generals was not nice so to say. I remember how soldiers discussed that in the trenches under Assinovskaya.

       - No, it was not Mityukhin's notorious illness that was the matter – though he did get down with radiculitis. It was something else. I remember the oppressive impression I had from the work on a mockup of the terrain. It was conducted by the commander when the advanced detachments had approached Grozny. Instead of outlining precise clear tasks on the actions in the city, solving the question of interaction between all the troops there was verbosity and verbiage, no specifics as if we were at command and staff training! I was especially amazed at the person in charge of the army indoctrination. He shared with those present about the custom of the grateful Chechen: they meet dear friends with flour. He promised that our heads would be sprinkled with flour. Meanwhile my soldiers were dying from bullets under Grozny.

Photo: Gennady Hamelianin
Aslan Maskhadov
       - Why did columns advance so slowly?

       - Subdivisions that comprised the combined detachments had been put together from different army units. They had not gone through the complete course of training and coordination. At times officers did not even know the names of all their soldiers. Moreover, members of one crew had known each other for 2-3 days. There could be no readiness for the coming battles. Grachev reported about that in the Security Council but the flywheel had already been launched. Often army intelligence was used to guard command posts – not for reconnaissance, underofficers were not prepared to exercise control in non-standard situation. It is one thing to fight an external enemy, everything is clear then. But in our situation there was fear, insecurity. Unfortunately we had failed to offer psychological training to the military because none of the politicians had plainly explained to us why we were going to Grozny and whom we were going to fight. T-62, BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-70 armored personnel carriers that we received were old: 20-25 years old. It was afterwards, at the end of December, that we all together prepared a battalion of the 503rd motorized rifle regiment. We received new armored, motor and engineering equipment, the uniform was delivered from the central depots.

       - Can you characterize the beginning of the first campaign using one word?

       - Confusion.

“We Lost the Battle before it Even Began.”

Photo: Gennady Hamelianin
Shamil Basayev
       - How did the local population meet the army?

       - Thanks to the propaganda of the separatists (primarily Movladi Udugov) the bulk of the republic's citizens perceived us as enemies, invaders who had attacked their sovereign state. According to them, we had come to entrain them, take them to the North where they would freeze to death. It was this thought that Udugov and other false informers like him rammed into the ordinary Chechen. We lost the battle in terms of ideology and information even before it began.

       - Which representatives of the Chechen opposition against Jokhar Dudayev did you meet?

       - Bislan Gantamirov was the first Chechen I met. I remembered his pleasant appearance, his smile. Then I met Salambek Khadzhiev who was always wearing gumboots. They supported the troops morally and provided them with valuable information. I especially remembered Ruslan Labazanov because of his boldness. He was a courageous guy. However, it was not so much that he liked us - he rather hated Dudayev. Later I met Doku Zavgaev.

Photo: Gennady Hamelianin
The Khasaviurt agreements have been signed. The Russian army is leaving the half-ruined Grozny (photo below) to come back three years later.
       - When was the shock from the first losses over?

       - After that dreadful New Year night. After what happened to the 131st Maikop brigade and the 81st motorized rifle regiment at the railroad station and in front of the Presidential Palace in Grozny. After we got into a trap. As we found out later the MVD internal troops “had forgotten” to set up block posts along which the advanced detachments moved. Battalions from the 19th motor rifle division and airborne troops were stuck in battles and could not come to the rescue of those who were encircled.

       - Why did this happen?

       - Some commanders had been slack. It was not to the beach where one can relax that our subdivisions had come, was it? Combat outposts had to be put up right away, the personnel and equipment had to be spread and sheltered, all-round defense had to be set up, i.e. it was necessary to prepare for battle.

Photo: Gennady Hamelianin
       - Who do you think is to blame for all these failures?

       - It is the politicians that start the war. However, in that situation I do not relieve the military leadership of the responsibility either. Their main fault was that they had under-evaluated the enemy and had unfounded confidence. It was only after that New Year night that everybody – from General to soldier – understood that you could not do that at war. We developed a different attitude towards planning and the realization of operations. Commanders analyzed and studied everything in detail. Only then decisions were made and operations planned.

       - Was it possible to avoid the introduction of troops to Chechnya?

       - I do not think that the country's political leadership did everything to avoid the war. An approach to Dudayev could be found. He was not a rascal as they are trying to present him today. On the eve of the introduction of the troops there was a moment when the president of Ichkeria was prepared to have negotiations with Boris Yeltsin. However, our leadership thought that this meeting would be a disgrace to put it mildly. This really hurt Dudayev's pride. Our statesmen lacked elementary flexibility back then. On the other hand though I remember Buinaksk, Volgodonsk, Tushino and Beslan. Figure it out for yourself if it was necessary to send troops to Chechnya.

   &
The Chechen Chronicle

November 30 – Boris Yeltsin signs secret edict “On Measures on Restoration of Constitutional Law and Order on the Territory of the Chechen Republic”. The decree envisages the introduction of the state of emergency and disarmament of illegal armed formations. The General Staff issues a directive, which specializes the tasks for the troops.

December 5 – the set-up of army groupings in the Mozdok, Kizlyar and Vladikavkaz axes is completed.

December 6 – Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Minister of the Interior Victor Erin meet with the president of Chechnya Jokhar Dudayev in the Ingush village of Sleptsovskaya.

December 9 – the president of the RF issues the edict “On Measures to Halt the Activity of Illegal Armed Formations on the Territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Zone of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict”; the government issues the decree that authorizes disarming by forcible methods. The North Caucasus Military District, the airborne troops, the MVD internal troops, the Caucasus special border district and the Federal Counterintelligence Service are commissioned with an operation on blocking and disarming the illegal armed formations in the Chechen republic.

December 10 – Defense Minister signs the directive and the order “On Shaping of Combined Grouping of the Armed Forces of the RF to Implement the Disarming of the Illegal Armed Formations on the Territory of the Chechen Republic”. The documents envisage the groupings' advance to Grozny, the blockade of the city and the disarming of the illegal armed formations on a voluntary basis or through forcible methods. The commander of the NCMD Colonel General Alexey Mityukhin is appointed in charge of the operation.

December 11 – Boris Yeltsin issues the edict “On Measures of Ensuring Law and Order and Public Security on the territory of the Chechen Republic”, which cancels the decree of November 30. At 7.00 the troops start advancing along the assigned routes and encounter active opposition on the part of the local population. The latter shoot at the army columns and block them. Roads and bridges are obstructed. There are first casualties; several dozen soldiers are taken captive.

December 12 – the Chechen regular army goes into action: their tubeless artillery shells the column of the composite regiment of the 106th division. Six military are killed, thirteen are wounded. Russian-Chechen negotiations start in Vladikavkaz.

December 14 – negotiations in Vladikavkaz are interrupted.

December 15 – Russian troops are slowly advancing into the interior of Chechnya; a war of details takes place.

December 17 – Boris Yeltsin sends a telegram to Jokhar Dudayev: “I suggest that you should meet with my plenipotentiary representatives Egorov and Stepashin in Mozdok as soon as possible”. It was expected that at the meeting with the presidential representative in Chechnya, Minister of Ethnic Issues Nikolay Egorov and the Director of the Federal Security Service, Sergey Stepashin, the document on the surrender of arms by the Chechen and on the cease-fire would be signed.

December 18 – the Air Force mounts rocket and bomb attacks on Grozny. Clashes continue.

December 19 – Colonel General Alexey Mityukhin is relieved from command. First deputy commander of ground troops Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev receives the offer to head the grouping however he refuses.

December 20 – first deputy head of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kvashnin is appointed the commander of the combined grouping of troops in Chechnya.

December 23 – Russian troops establish themselves in Khankala.

December 26 – Grozny is blocked from the Northeast, the North, the Northwest and the West. The Government of National Revival is set up. It is headed by Salambek Khadzhiev. The territorial department of federal executive bodies starts working in Chechnya. It is headed by Egorov.

December 30 – the planning of the assault on the Chechen capital and the formation of the assault detachments to mount the operation are completed.

December 31 – the troops enter Grozny. In the first hours the federal forces encounter no resistance and reach the center of the city. By the evening the Chechen block the military columns and start destroying them. Because of lack of control, communication and coordination the troops suffer great losses. There begin severe protracted battles.

January 19, 1995 – the troops occupy the Presidential Palace that has been abandoned by the people of Dudayev. Boris Yeltsin announces the end of the military stage of the operation and the replacement of the army with the forces of the Interior Ministry. Battles in Grozny continue.

February 6 – Pavel Grachev reports that Grozny is under the complete control of the troops.

By the beginning of April Dudayev's units leave all major inhabited localities. The war passes onto the guerilla stage.

The Strength and Equipment in the Chechen war
Federal SideRebels
October 1999
Personnel
Around 20,000 peopleAround 16,500-18,500 people (10,500 – in regular formations, 6,000-8,000 – in the units of field commanders)
Military Equipment
More than 100 tanks, more than 300 BMP and BTR
There is no data on artillery and aviation.
60 BMP and BTR
30 artillery systems
December 2004
Personnel
55,000 – 70,000 people (40,000 – permanently stationed units, 15,000 – 30,000 – attached subdivisions)1,500-5,000 people with light armament
Military Equipment
Around 150 tanks, up to 400 BMP and BTR
More than 100 artillery systems
There is no data on aviation.




Newspapers Won't Lie

Kommersant
December 13, 1994

       The Situation in Chechnya
       If the political aspect of the operation in Chechnya has brought about the split of the Russian society the military one has demonstrated the helplessness of the command: the advocates of the use of force in the solution of the crisis have never seen either the blockade of the republic or the seizure of its capital. It is obvious that in planning the operation the leadership of the three power departments in the North Caucasus made serious miscalculations. The troops turned out to be unprepared even for such turn of events (which is usual for the hotbeds in the former Union) as unarmed civil population blocking the road for the military equipment. As for the explanation of the military that the advance of the troops was stopped by the fog, this is nothing but an attempt to make the best of a bad bargain. Miscalculations and time keep aggravating the situation in Chechnya and its vicinity. The probability that the Russian troops will either start retaliating with concentrated fire (as response to the shelling and casualties in their ranks) or will refuse to use force (under the influence of the local population) is increasing. In both cases the Chechen campaign will completely discredit itself – even in the eyes of its original allies.

Kuranty
December 15, 1994

       A Tumor Must be Operated
       The problem is very simple. Is Chechnya part of Russia or not? If it is, then the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the president of Russia “are superior” to the constitution and president of Chechnya. He was legal until the time he announced that Chechnya was a sovereign state that had nothing to do with Russia… The encroachment upon the integrity of the Russian state is a grave crime, which should entail tough, adequate measures. These measures have not been taken in the course of several years. This is what the leadership of Russia should be reproached for. Why should the participation of the Russian special services, the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry in the events in Chechnya be refuted? This is the direct responsibility of these departments. Instead – the tanks and the planes are not ours, the tankmen and pilots are not ours either… This means that you recognize the fact that Chechnya is not part of Russia, doesn't it? There is no doubt that the people of Chechnya have the right to decide their fate on their own. If the people and their leaders decide that it is time to become a sultanate – suit yourselves. Sultan Jokhar the First – sounds good. However, on the condition that the sultanate is in the composition of the RF… Negotiations are impossible and impermissible until the leadership of the republic makes a clear and unambiguous statement that Chechnya is part of Russia…

Krasnaya Zvezda
December 16, 1994

       … Judging by the incoming information, the opposition on the part of the local population is increasing in the Bratskoye, Ozernoye and Beni-Yurt inhabited localities. The youth is trying to organize combat units, to arms themselves with the captured combat equipment and small arms and to come to the rescue of Grozny. According to the press center of the MVD internal troops, these days it is openly anti-Russian and anti-army materials that dominate in the programs of the Ingush television. The Moslems of the North Caucasus are called to stand up for the “holy war in defense of Chechnya”… On December 15, some details of the tragedy of the refugees who are leaving the combat area and Grozny became known. Several hundred people arrived in Khasaviurt. There suddenly appeared Dudayev's fighters. There is information, according to which, they cruelly murdered the refugees, throwing women and children out of the windows of the houses where they were hiding. On December 14, the vice-premier of Russia presidential representative in Chechnya Nikolay Egorov met with the representatives of the administration and the people of the Mozdok region… He specially emphasized that rumors on preparation for the alleged deportation of the Chechen people were actively spread in Chechnya…

Tomskaya Nedelya
December 16, 1994

       “War does not Bear Sons…”
       Every day at 2 p.m. the representatives of the Chechen population of the Tomsk region get together in the Revolution Square to demonstrate their protest against the introduction of troops into the Chechen republic. They do not support Dudayev. Their main demand is that troops be withdrawn from Chechnya and the people be allowed to decide on their own what should be done next, to hold a referendum, elections. When asked by our correspondent if the information on the situation in the Chechen republic presented by the Russian mass media differed greatly from the real state of things, the co-chairman of the national-cultural Vainah center, Ahiat Saidullaev, said that there was little distortion however the manner of the presentation was one-sided. The fact that the column of tanks under Grozny was stopped by Russian women with children had not been reported anywhere. A lot of Russian military surrender voluntarily because they do not want to participate in this strange war… The representatives of the Chechen diaspora have assured us that there will be no diversions or other terrorist acts. They do not know where such rumors originate from. They hope that the problem can be solved in a peaceful way.

Moscow News
December 18, 1994

       The Second Caucasian War
       At dawn on December 11, three Russian armored columns assumed the aggressive on Chechnya from three directions – from Ingushetia, Dagestan and North Ossetia. There is no such thing as partial participation of the army in the events: it either fights to the full or does not.

       Firstly, one cannot fight on the sly because not only does this inevitably result in a shameful defeat of the attacking side but also this entails big casualties among the civilians.

       Secondly, it is impossible to fight in the cities that are outside the officially declared theaters of warfare because the population is absolutely unprepared for possible combat operations.

       Thirdly, a military that has received service weapon and is on the mission to destroy the enemy should have the status of the country's defender.

       Fourthly, if there emerges a national and an inner-state conflict one should not hastily and unconditionally side with either one of the parties at war because in this case the threat of the civil war or terrorist acts “in the aggressor's rear” greatly increases.

       All of the above-said are the elementary truths, which are known to any professional officer.

       It is unlikely that there exists a clear plan of actions in Chechnya. It is unlikely that there is one person in charge of it… In general everything in Russia is done so carelessly that at times it is impossible to answer the following question: who will benefit? It could be that Yeltsin hopes for a violent victorious operation. However, the drawn-out “Afghan variant” is more likely. It is the legal basis of the actions taken by the Russian authorities that is absolutely unclear.

       They are trying to prove that there are laws, which allow using the army and the internal troops for combat operations inside the Russian Federation. They refer to the three-year old decree on the illegitimacy of Dudayev's power, which was adopted by Khasbulatov's Supreme Council. It is obvious that the “war party” plans to deal with the political opponents with the help of the Chechen conflict. The calculation is simple: the introduction of the state of emergency in the North Caucasus will inevitably result in the escalation of tension in other regions; terrorist acts in the center of Russia are possible. This will be the ground for the introduction of the state of emergency all over the country and consequently for the ban of all opposition in general, the liquidation of free press and the introduction of authoritarian regime.



“The Personnel on ACV is a Target for Snipers.”

From the report of the former head of the NCMD headquarters Lieutenant General V.Potapov “Actions of Formations, Units and Subdivisions of Ground Troops in the Course of the Special Operation on the Disarming of Illegal Armed Formations on the Territory of the Chechen Republic” (1995)

On 21.12 the experience of combat actions of the first 10 days of the special operation was analyzed and generalized. The experience has shown that there are a number of substantial neglects and flaws in the actions of the troops…

Main Deficiencies

The march potential of the equipment is used poorly because of constant breakdowns of assembly units especially of the outdated BTR-70.

Poor training of the officers in the sphere of combat organization and management.

At all axes the laying of aviation is done on the same frequency, which complicates communication.

Maneuvering forces and armored groups are not used for the solution of the suddenly emerging tasks on the guarding and defense of the region.

Airdrop and special subdivisions are not used for the purpose of solving the tasks posed.

There are no active night actions.

Troop commanders do not issue tasks to the artillery. The latter does the shelling on its own and the troop commanders function on their own.

Poor organization of interaction with the neighbors (internal MVD troops, airborne troops, aviation) in the course of operations and insufficient information supply from the ranking headquarters on the disposition of the own troops, the disposition and the character or actions of the enemy. This complicates the planning and the conduct of fire for the artillery.

Artillery's means of technical reconnaissance (PRP-4, SNAR-10, ARK) are not used to the full because of the under manning with experts.

The motorized rifle divisions, which are on the battlefront, poorly observe the results of the fire conducted by the artillery.

Artillery smoke screen is not used for the blinding of the enemy.

The actions of alert batteries are not planned (at night either - to hit the suddenly emerging targets).

Anti-tank guided missile systems and anti-tank batteries are not used.

Tactical reconnaissance is done passively, there is no precision in the determination of the position of targets, military information is contradictory. Often reconnaissance subdivisions are used for guarding command posts, not for scouting.

Loud speakers are poorly used for the work with the local population.

The change of battle arrays is not practiced in case detachments spend more than one day at one place.

Terrain compartments are poorly used for stationing the service troops.

The analysis of sanitary and irreparable losses demonstrates that when on mission the personnel and especially officers do not use the means of individual protection (tin hats and body armor). In the course of the march and when passing through inhabited localities the personnel is on top of the ACV, the commanders of machines control the actions of the drivers also being on top with open hatches. They are a target for snipers and receive head wounds as a result.

The armaments and the equipment of the formations and units arriving in the area of special operation from other districts are in an unsatisfactory condition, unprepared for combat use. Drivers lack practical experience of driving combat machines and cars.

The front-line units lack maintenance teams.
Sergey Artemov

All the Article in Russian as of Dec. 06, 2004

See Also
FSB: The Arabs Shelter Sh. Basayev ... // News (Jan. 18, 2005) Qatar to Return Russian Convicts ... // News (Dec. 23, 2004) Germany and EU will Help Regulate ... // News (Dec. 21, 2004) Russian Defense Ministry Prepares ... // News (Dec. 10, 2004) Basaev Collects Levy from Entire ... // News (Dec. 09, 2004)
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