A protest near the Georgian embassy in Moscow, August 10, 2008
Photo: Kirill Tulin
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Spare the Rod, Bury the Hatchet
// The price of the question
Russia acknowledged Georgia’s territorial integrity for a long time. Everything changed after the events in August, particularly Russia’s position, recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the basis of a unilateral politico-legal document. That was followed by the conclusion of an agreement on friendship with the newly recognized Caucasus republics as though they were sovereign states. On the basis of those agreements, Russia can not only provide military aid, but defend them in conflicts as well.
It has to be said that there is no institution of recognition codified in international law. In essence, recognition is a politico-legal document that any state can make use of or not. Which is what Russia did when it recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But it did not recognize Kosovo. Western states have done exactly the opposite. The institution of recognition makes relations between the recognized and the recognizer easier. But it does not settle issues with countries that do not recognize the independence of a republic. For example, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, considering themselves independent now, should have their own citizens and issue them passports. But when that happens, their citizens will only be able to travel to Russia – well, and to Nicaragua. To move freely about in the world, they will need passports recognized by the world community, like Russian passports. That means that the citizens of those republics will become uniformly Russians.
All of these steps have increased tensions between Russia and Georgia. They will certainly not increase stability in the Caucasus. Looking at the situation from the point of view of winning and losing, it looks as though both Moscow and Tbilisi have lost. Georgia lost territory and deepened its differences with Russia. But Moscow lost as well. By taking control over part of Georgia, it has possibly lost the greater part of it forever. The winners are the third parties of the United States and NATO. The North Atlantic alliance has automatically gained the opportunity to have military bases in Georgia – close to the Russian border. Thus, in the long run, it may turn into an international conflict.
There is a way out of this dead end. Politicians who are guided by the principle of service to their people will be able to find it. If forces come to power in Georgia that want to restore relations with Russia, and Moscow will to meet them halfway, the Kremlin is likely to be willing to reconsider the point in the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan about the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With a constructive approach, it could be possible to find models for a settlement under which the republics would receive broad autonomy within Georgia or create something like a confederation. But first, they have to understand in Moscow and Tbilisi that they are both historically and genetically fated to be friends. The real question is who will be ready to make up first.
Aslan Abashidze, professor, Moscow State University of Foreign Affairs
All the Article in Russian as of Oct. 30, 2008
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