And Now a Word about the Caucasus
// The price of the question
Russian military units have completely left the buffer zones separating Abkhazia and South Ossetia from their own Georgian territory. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stressed in his speech in Evian that the Russian withdrawal would be carried out ahead of schedule. He tried to use that as a sign that Russia views the problems with Georgia as a local conflict and an annoying discrepancy in strategic relations with the West. But it is still too soon to declare the Russian-Georgian conflict over.
Moscow considers the affair over now that it has withdrawn its forces from the buffer zones. The issue of a military and political presence in the two former Georgian autonomies seems decided as well. After the Kremlin recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian leadership has assumed that the two former Georgian autonomies have no more connection to Georgia. That would all be fine, except that Moscow’s interpretation of the situation is far from universally accepted. In Georgia, they assume that peacekeeping operations will be continued, only under the aegis of international organizations. They consider the withdrawal of Russian forces from the buffer zones insufficient. They understand “full withdrawal” to mean their replacement in the “rebellious autonomies” as well, or at least their cooperation with European peacekeepers.
The European position is even more complicated. The PACE has demanded that Russia annul its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. All the European countries recognize the territorial integrity of Georgia. On the other hand, French President Nicolas Sarkozy himself has agreed to an international discussion of the status of the two former autonomies, which is in practice an acknowledgment that they are outside of Georgia’s legal and political realm. German Chancellor Angela Merkel is acting similarly when she uses the term “Georgia’s core territory.” On the whole, the European Union is not ready for a full-scale confrontation with Russia. At least not over Georgia. But the Europeans have tried to avoid making a hard choice. The French president’s behavior is indicative. In Moscow, he agreed to the withdrawal of Russian forces only from the buffer zone, and in Tbilisi he revised his position.
Thus, immediately after the “early withdrawal,” an argument will begin over what stage the process is in. For Moscow, renouncing the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the present conditions would mean more than just a loss of reputation. That step would, at the least, have serious consequences in the North Caucasus, where weakness is inexcusable.
At the same time, Moscow cannot refuse the internationalization of the Caucasian problem. Without it, Moscow cannot attain even minimal legitimacy for its actions in the war and after it. There is only one choice left. That is to minimize the problem in the course of long negotiations – to talk it away. You want international discussions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, then let’s talk.
Sergey Markedonov, head of the international relations section, Political and Military Analysis Institute
All the Article in Russian as of Oct. 10, 2008
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