| Other Photos |
 |
|
 |
“There Are No Rich Oligarchs in the USA Buying up Abkhaz Beaches”
// Matthew J. Bryza told Kommersant about the reasons for the U.S. interest in Abkhazia
The West has been more aggressively pushing Russia aside in settling the “frozen conflicts” in the post-Soviet space, proposing its own peace-keeping plans, meanwhile. Matthew J. Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, who visited Moscow at the end of the last week, told Kommersant correspondent Alexander Gabuev why Washington opposes Russia’s monopoly on the negotiation process.
“It’s the second time you come to Moscow since the beginning of the summer. Previously, you discussed the situation in Georgia. What about now?”
“Yes, I really discussed the Georgian matter with General Yevgeny Buzhinsky in the Defense Ministry (head of the international department with the ministry – Kommersant), and with First Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Denissov.”
“Is the situation so grave that you have to meet with Russia’s military?”
“Why not? The Abkhaz question embraces aspects referring to the diplomatic and the defense spheres. For example, Russia’s base in Gudaut. The problem of the peace-keepers in the conflict zone can be referred to this point too.”
“Did you discuss any concrete suggestions?”
“To us, the most important thing now is making Georgia and Abkhazia launch direct talks. The format doesn’t play any role. They can be held in the framework of the UN Secretary-General’s group of friends, which would be most preferable to us. The USA is the group’s member, along with Russia. But if the parties want to talk separately in some other place – it’s perfect.”
“What about St.-Petersburg or Sochi?”
“Brilliant! St.-Petersburg, Sochi, Novosibirsk – we don’t care. We only wish they would talk. If the parties consider that they want to negotiate without the U.S. collaboration – good, if they want our assistance – perfect. We have a clear-cut task – settle the dispute so that it complied with the national interests of the USA. And what national interests do we have in Abkhazia? Hardly any. There are no rich oligarchs in the USA buying up Abkhaz beaches, we do not want to turn Abkhazia into a source of sand and gravel for Sochi’s Olympic facilities, we have no business interest there. Our only interest is the absence of war in the region so that Georgia could be stable.”
“And what about pipelines crossing Georgia, like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan one?”
“Of course, we have such kind of interests in Southern Caucasus. We make no secret of it. First of all, it’s security interests. Then energy ones – pipelines and all that stuff. Certainly, the USA has these interests. And the third interest is promoting democracy. And we can’t succeed unless we move in the three directions simultaneously. So, our interests in the “frozen conflicts” is evident. A solution must allow to secure Georgia’s territorial integrity at that. It’s the official position of the USA and Russia as well. No matter who proclaims independence, legally, Abkhazia is Georgia’s part. But the matter of the status is the one to be addressed in the long run. So far we must occupy ourselves with the economic rehabilitation of the region, and primarily, defuse military tensions.”
“But to this end, you’ll have to eliminate concrete obstacles. For example, resolve the matter of Georgia’s military units being deployed in the Upper Kodori.”
“First of all, we want talks without any preliminary conditions. We hope that at the first stage the parties will conclude a cease-fire agreement. Not only Moscow wants it, rather, it’s Sukhumi’s desire. The Abkhaz are afraid that Georgia can attack them.”
“Do these fears have ground?”
“I don’t know whether they do or not, but the fear is real. The Abkhaz must get four sets of security guarantees from the Georgians. First of all, that there is no military conflict possible. Second, economic security. We’d like Abkhazia to interact economically with Georgia, Turkey, the EU countries and other states of the Black sea region. There must be guarantees of cultural and political security. When Georgian refugees return to Abkhazia in large groups, the political and cultural rights of the Abkhaz minority may be challenged, so, the Georgian party must take account of their protection when drafting the peace plan. As to the Kodori Gorge, the Abkhaz party must offer something in exchange for a withdrawal of the Georgian police officers. It all must be included in the deal the parties have started to discuss. They just need to sit down at the negotiations table.”
“Why haven’t these talks been launched?”
“The Georgian party was ready to launch them. As I visited Tbilisi at the end of July, the Georgian government was ready to set off for Berlin, where negotiations would have started. In Sukhumi, I tried to persuade President Sergey Bagapsh and Foreign Office Chief Sergey Shamba to go to Berlin, but they insisted on meeting their preliminary demands.”
“Russia’s diplomats also made it the point that the meeting was too early.”
“I can’t give commentary whether there were any undercover agreements. I can only point out that, coincidentally, the two parties simultaneously refused to come to Berlin. Perhaps, it was not pure chance, I don’t know.”
“In May the counterparts began direct talks: Irakli Alasania, Georgia’s Ambassador to the United Nations, visited Sukhumi. You paid a visit to Abkhazia a day before, whereas Moscow didn’t seem to mind it. What happened?”
“I can’t explain it myself. I had very constructive negotiations. After they were over, Sergey Shamba said that the Abkhaz party was ready to launch direct talks, and it felt even more confident, with the American delegation present. It was a perfect start. A few weeks later Georgia claimed in the UN that it cancelled the flights of its unmanned flying jets over the territory of Abkhazia; more to the point, it asked Russia to consult with Tbilisi in case it carried out any activities in Abkhazia. It also pledged to withdraw its commandos and heavy artillery from the region. And on the next day Moscow deployed its railroad construction troops in Abkhazia.”
“Shortly after that you visited Moscow at the beginning of July. How did it react to the U.S. active collaboration?”
“Quite normally. Since we’re part of the negotiation process in the framework of the UN Secretary-General’s group of friends for Georgia. It’s a fact.”
“Did the Russian diplomats raise the question of Georgia’s admission to NATO?”
“You can always feel it in the air when it comes to Georgia. Our position is clear: Georgia has met all the MAP requirements. But it is not the same as membership in the alliance. Georgia will have to work its way to get NATO admission.”
“Should the issue of Georgia’s admission to NATO be included in the cluster of agreements about the Abkhaz settlement? You said on several occasions that Russia is another party in the conflict in Georgia, and every party has their interests.”
“The USA objects to such a link. Georgia wants to join the alliance, and we support its determination. It’s not because we want to hurt Russia. We know that Moscow is concerned over the security of its southern borders. It’s been the case since the times of Ivan the Terrible, and we don’t want to fuel the fears once again.”
“Nevertheless, American experts have suggested undertaking harsh measures towards Russia in connection with the situation over Georgia. You can recollect a recent report of David Phillips, expert with the Atlantic Council, who suggested boycotting the Sochi Olympics and introducing air patrolling of Abkhazia by NATO forces.”
“The situation hasn’t been that serious to talk about the USA boycotting the Olympics in Sochi. But if war starts in Abkhazia, which lies a few kilometers away from Krasnaya Polyana, it won’t contribute to the Olympics, for sure.”
Alexander Gabuev
All the Article in Russian as of Aug. 04, 2008
|
|
|
